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historical Russian influence? How has the renovation of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy expanded 
under the leadership and outward focus of President Nur Sultan Nazarbayev and the Kazakh 
government? This thesis argues that Kazakhstan, after independence, positioned itself in a place 
of power by using its ambitious foreign policy to bolster Kazakhstan’s leadership in international 
organizations, advance domestic economic infrastructure, and internationalize its higher education 
system. This thesis establishes specific metrics for success based on the Kazakh governments 
intentions and goals to measure Kazakhstan’s achievement in each of these areas. Beginning in the 
early 1990s Kazakhstan has actively participated in the international community through nuclear 
nonproliferation efforts, membership in the World Trade Organization, the United Nations 
Security Council and a variety of regional cooperative organizations. More recently, Kazakhstan 
has engaged in a strategic partnership with China that has created economic and transportation 
infrastructure within Kazakhstan that was greatly needed to increase efficiency. Lastly, 
Nazarbayev has profoundly restructured the previously Soviet higher education system in order to 
advance Kazakhstan’s international academic competitiveness. Each of these sectors has advanced 
in accordance with Nazarbayev’s declared goals and initiatives and together provide Kazakhstan 
greater independence from Russian influence.  
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Discussion on Translations 
 
 This thesis used a variety of different official speeches from the Kazakh government. 
Some government speeches are unavailable in English, and therefore I have translated a few 
phrases and initiatives that are used in this thesis. The quotes that I have translated do not require 
romanization due to the ability to transliterate the Russian language. I have a professional and 
working understanding of the language due to four years of study in addition to four months of 
experience living in St Petersburg, Russia.
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
I. Introduction and Background 
 
The year 1991 marked a watershed in history when the Soviet Union disintegrated and all of 
its satellite states were thrust into sudden independence. The world watched as the largest 
modern empire crumbled. Russia had colonized and exploited Central Asia for their plethora of 
raw materials, but after the fall of the USSR, the international community was optimistic about 
the potential for the newly independent Central Asian states (Pipes, 1964; Pomfret & Anderson, 
2001). There were hopes of economic partnerships, geopolitical collaboration, and liberal 
democracy, yet those dreams were quickly shattered due to Russia’s continued assertion of 
dominance in the area.  
All Central Asian states were “forced to become independent states” in the decision made by 
only a few select Soviet officials in late 1991 (Sovereignty After Empire: Comparing the Middle 
East and Central Asia). After this decision, there was an overall urgency and unpreparedness of 
the Central Asian states to function on their own. The five Central Asian countries - Uzbekistan, 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan - lacked statehood prior to their 
incorporation into the USSR. After independence, they were left with Soviet centrally-planned 
economies as a basis for economic development and each country implemented a different 
variation of authoritarian governance (Pomfret & Anderson, 2001; Khan 2019). The abrupt 
change in regional governance in 1991 and 1992 led to a variety of different adaptation plans, 
inherently individually distinguishing each Central Asian republic politically and economically. 
 
Kazakhstan, the largest Central Asian country, had the highest standard of living in 1991 out 
of all the Central Asian republics and had the closest connection to Russia even after 
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independence. This was due to the two countries’ mutual collaboration in developing 
Kazakhstan’s natural resources and the close relationship Kazakh President Nazarbayev 
maintained with Soviet leadership (Aitken, 2010). Beyond Russia’s limited assistance, 
Kazakhstan, upon independence, immediately sought the help of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
to support its economy. Among its first investors were the United States and Russia, both largely 
motivated by Kazakhstan’s vast oil reserves (Curtis, 2008). Kazakhstan has since succeeded in 
developing extensive foreign policy. The now independent country has demonstrated leadership 
in a variety of international organizations, collaborated with world leaders to improve its 
economic infrastructure, and reformed its higher education system, all helping to make 
Kazakhstan a competitive international power.  
As a counterfactual example to Kazakhstan’s development, Uzbekistan moved in the 
opposite direction developmentally, and removed itself from almost all international 
engagements. President Islam Karimov engaged in intense nationalization of Uzbekistan evident 
in his publication, “Ideology of National Independence.” His nationalization process quickly 
closed off Uzbekistan’s borders, restricted outside investment, and barely moved past the Soviet 
method of a centrally planned economy (March, 2010). Uzbekistan allowed limited international 
aid within its borders, yet shut off most opportunities for international scholars to explore its 
country’s progress from within the state (Yalcin, 2002). This shut-out included Uzbekistan’s 
general ambivalence to Putin’s agenda in Central Asia (Nurullayev, 2016). The country shows 
signs of potential international progress with its new president, Shavkat Miriyoyev, who has 
already expressed a desire in improving relations with China, Russia, and the United States 
(“Uzbekistan's New Leader Pledges Better Ties with Russia, US”). Uzbekistan’s path after 
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independence is vastly different from that of Kazakhstan and helps to highlight the singularity of 
Kazakhstan’s development.   
Internationally, Central Asian individual states are often lumped together in their battles of 
independence after 1991 due to the resulting establishment of un-democratic governance systems 
in the region (Hale, 2016). Through careful analysis, this thesis, however, establishes that 
through Kazakhstan’s efforts and utilization of its strengths in foreign policy, Kazakhstan has 
developed a position in the international community independent of its historic positioning under 
Soviet control. This point alone has helped Kazakhstan succeed far past all other Central Asian 
countries. In addition to Kazakhstan’s original efforts, numerous government-declared initiatives 
outline the country’s goals for the future. The most recent of these initiatives is the Kazakhstan 
2050 Strategy, which declares Kazakhstan’s goal of gaining a position as one of the world’s top 
thirty most developed countries (Nazarbayev, 2017). The Kazakh government’s various goals for 
Kazakhstan are cited throughout this thesis and are used as metrics to measure and analyze the 
success of Kazakhstan’s different foreign policy initiatives.  
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Figure 1.1: Map of Kazakhstan and bordering countries1 
 
Another important facet of Kazakhstan’s political actions is its geographic positioning. It 
maintains a unique position in the world, as it is strategically located between two major world 
powers, China and Russia. This is displayed in the map above. Nazarbayev’s skilled leadership 
helped Kazakhstan open its borders and establish itself as a country with a potential beyond that 
expected of a post-soviet autocratic government. This thesis will answer the question of how 
Kazakhstan’s foreign policy has grown under the leadership and outward focus of Nazarbayev 
and the Kazakh government. I argue that Kazakhstan, after independence, positioned itself in a 
place of power by using its ambitious foreign policy to bolster Kazakhstan’s leadership in 
international organizations, advance domestic economic infrastructure, and internationalize its 
 
1 This map shows Kazakhstan in relation to China, Russia, and other Central Asian countries to provide a context of 
geographical location for the rest of the thesis (Cooley, 2020). 
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higher education system. These aspects of Kazakhstan’s outward-focused policy have 
strengthened relations with countries other than Russia. Because of these relations with other 
countries, Kazakhstan is able to exercise its independence and establish sovereignty distinct from 
the historical Russian dominance in the country. 
The rest of chapter one will discuss the various existing academic arguments surrounding the 
question of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy and relationship with Russia. This chapter also contains 




This thesis asks the question of how the renovation of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy has 
expanded under the leadership and outward focus of President Nur Sultan Nazarbayev and the 
Kazakh government. To answer it, I have shaped my argument around three areas of 
Kazakhstan’s foreign policy and have examined each area’s effect on Kazakhstan’s historical 
partnership with Russia.  
While a country’s foreign policy can encapsulate a wide array of areas, I have analyzed a 
narrowed scope of foreign policy through analysis of three of Kazakhstan’s policy initiatives that 
provide Kazakhstan the greatest opportunity to further increase their sovereignty. Each area of 
analysis demonstrates Kazakhstan’s collaboration with other countries and international 
organizations. These collaborations provide new opportunities for Kazakhstan’s development in 
sectors previously dominated by Russian influence. My thesis examines the cause of 
Kazakhstan’s ambitious and outward-focused policies and the leadership of Nazarbayev. In each 
chapter I evaluate the various effects from this cause that come out of Nazarbayev’s broader 
goals. My argument is that through a strong collaborative international presence, Kazakhstan has 
 
    6 
effectively increased its sovereignty from Russia and improved Kazakhstan’s standing in the 
international community. Nazarbayev has played a critical role in this ongoing achievement, as 
he prioritized extensive foreign policy and developed a diplomatic approach to international 
relations - a multi-vectored approach - to balance Kazakhstan’s critical relationships with Russia, 
China, and the West. Kazakhstan’s sovereignty from Russia is a combined result of 
Kazakhstan’s leadership in international institutions, its facilitation of a strong Sino-Kazakh 
economic partnership, and the reform and internationalization of its higher education system. 
Details confirming Kazakhstan’s dependency fall beyond the scope of this thesis, as my 
research question focuses on the specific areas of development that Kazakhstan is using to 
establish sovereignty and is not seeking to establish dependency2. 
A variety of government initiatives have increased Kazakhstan’s sovereignty from Russia 
and have improved the country’s positioning in Central Asia. I support my argument by 
separating the different contributing pieces into three chapters that inform the reader of the facts 
relevant to my argument.  
In order to define and measure the successes of Kazakhstan’s policies, I outline the metrics of 
success for each policy. I first delineate what the government’s original goals for that sector 
were, and after addressing Kazakhstan’s motivations for that specific area of foreign policy, I 
evaluate whether and how those goals were achieved. To accurately depict the goals of the 
Kazakh government, I draw upon speeches found on various official Kazakhstan Government 
websites such as primeminister.kz, akorda.kz, and kazakhstan2050.com. I also draw from 
 
2 While this thesis does not discuss the details confirming Kazakhstan’s dependence on Russia, here are some 
articles that delineate this process. Laruelle et al. (2019) outline the foreign policy vectors between Kazakhstan and 
Russia in detail. They discuss the details of the relationship during the Soviet Union’s existence and after. 
Furthermore, Dawīša (1995) discusses Russia’s foreign policy in post-Soviet Central Asia and goes into depth on the 
various ways that Russia establishes dominance in the region and continues its aggressive influence in the area. 
There is further discussion of the subject in the literature review.  
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speeches by different Kazakh leaders as well as various governmental decrees and initiatives. 
The speeches I have used all discuss Kazakhstan’s motivations and plans for the future to best 
define its political goals. I have chosen this metric of analysis as it allows me to measure success 
in terms of Kazakhstan’s official goals and achievements, instead of by potentially different 
international or individual perspectives. If I were to use other metrics, they may include a human 
rights or civil society analysis that would distract from the direct relationship of these initiatives 
to the ability of Kazakhstan to develop sovereignty beyond Russia’s influence. 
In using mostly government proclamations to measure Kazakhstan’s success, it is necessary 
to acknowledge that Kazakhstan’s government is authoritarian and historically, public statements 
of authoritarian governments can contain biases. I accommodate for this factor by only using 
parts of speeches where Nazarbayev states his goals and aspirations for Kazakhstan. For my 
research purposes, I use these goals as a baseline to measure Kazakhstan’s advancement because, 
despite any potential for bias, these speeches were public and are available online, and therefore 
I will use them to hold Nazarbayev and the Kazakh government accountable.    
 Kazakhstan’s demonstration of international leadership and its partnership with China are 
well established in literature. But my analysis of Kazakhstan’s higher education reform focuses 
on the preliminary areas of Kazakhstan’s development, as a large portion of reforms in 
Kazakhstan’s higher education sector are still underway.  
My thesis also discusses sovereignty and independence. These are terms that can be 
interpreted in many ways. For the purposes of this thesis, when I mention sovereignty I am 
specifically discussing interdependence sovereignty. I explain my decision for the differentiation 
and discuss the variety of definitions for the term in the literature review.   
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The rest of my thesis, beyond metrics for analysis of these domestic goals, is developed from 
a vast study of the academic literature available through the University of Michigan research 
databases. The majority of literature used are secondary sources that delineate Kazakhstan’s 
foreign policy strategy of multi-vectorism, and analyze their education reforms and international 
memberships (Kassen, 2018). I chose to use primarily secondary sources because of the 
expansive availability of knowledge and analysis that they provide. By using secondary sources, 
I am able to aggregate primary sources and compare differing opinions on the variety of subjects 
I incorporate. Additionally, I have accessed and cited a variety of official websites, such as those 
of the United Nations Security Council, the World Trade Organization, the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the CIA World Factbook. 
These websites provide critical information on Kazakhstan’s actions and the subsequent 
international perspective on said actions. 
In preparation for writing this thesis I first read Nazarbaev’s biography, Nazarbaev and the 
Making of Kazakhstan, to understand the longitudinal history of Kazakhstan's independence, as 
the book outlines Nazarbayev’s leadership during the USSR and his presidency after 
independence. I also read Pauline Jones’ Oil is Not a Curse to gain a wider knowledge of 
Kazakhstan’s economic situation and utility of their natural resources (Aitken, 2010; Luong, 
2011).  
The time frame that my research encapsulates begins with the fall of the USSR and goes 
up until the end of Nazarbaev’s presidency in early 2019. While this is a large timespan, I 
primarily use information from after 2000 to remain up to date on Kazakh international and 
domestic policies. This timespan enables a cohesive period to analyze with no change in 
leadership. I include analysis of the current president Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s influence on 
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Kazakhstan’s foreign policy in only the conclusion as his presidential term began in 2019, after 
the cut off for my designated time period (“Toqaev Inaugurated As Kazakhstan’s New President 
Following Election Protests”, 2019).  
This thesis brings together different areas of research to argue that Kazakhstan’s significant 
international collaboration and relationships with the West have resulted in a modernized and 
internationally active state, allowing Kazakhstan to establish its independence from its history of 
Russian colonization. As a resource-rich country, Kazakhstan often is a point of in-depth 
economic research. I have chosen to evaluate only some aspects of Kazakhstan’s economy in an 
effort to focus on the larger qualitative cause and effect of Kazakhstan's foreign policy and its 
effect on international relations instead of pursuing a solely economic approach.  
Furthermore, I focus specifically on Kazakhstan’s internationally-focused policies. My 
research argues that Kazakhstan is the most advanced of the Central Asian states and has moved 
past any assumption of a country completely dependent on its natural resources - a rentier state 
(Jones, 2011).  
In my conclusion, I state the accumulated evidence established throughout my thesis and, 
while drawing on aspects of the 2050 Strategy, I make the final conclusion that Kazakhstan, 
through its outward-focused policies, has developed notable independence from Russia’s strong 
influence.  
 
III. Literature Review 
 
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the world has watched Soviet satellite states fall apart or 
form successful states through efforts including attempting democratization, foreign direct 
investment, and/or continuing a partnership with Russia. Post-1991 Eurasia has seen an immense 
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amount of literature covering development hypotheses, power dynamics, and economic 
predictions. As a continuation, the literature on Kazakhstan post-2000 addresses its unique 
geopolitical positioning and resource abundance. Much of this literature, while detailed and vast, 
does not connect Kazakhstan’s foreign policy accomplishments with its subsequent increased 
autonomy from Russia, as it seeks out resources and opportunities for security elsewhere. This is 
a gap in the literature that I plan to fill with the information provided in this thesis.  
 
A. Resource Curse Debate 
A prevalent argument that exists in literature surrounding Kazakhstan’s process of 
modernization debates the exact cause of its modernization and international reputation. Scholars 
on all sides of this multilateral debate cite Kazakhstan’s achievements as either a product of 
Nazarbayev’s strategic leadership and foreign policy approach, or as simply a result of the 
international community’s dependence on its resources. 
Kazakhstan maintains immense natural resources. This availability to natural resources 
aids Kazakhstan’s positioning in the international community, as it makes the country desirable 
to investors. Its status as a post-Soviet autocracy has generated a lot of contradictory literature 
that battles between declaring Kazakhstan “gifted” or “cursed” with these resources. Scholars 
such as Warner and Franke et. al. provide evidence that connects a state’s inefficiency with its 
simultaneous abundance of resources.  
Warner (2001), and Franke et. al. (2009) assume the confirmatory side of the entrenched 
link between resource wealth and institutional and state weakness, establishing that access to 
natural resources dooms a country to an autocratic style of governance. Their literature highlights 
the direct link between resource abundance and top-heavy governments. In support of the 
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resource curse narrative, they point out that “resource-cursed” countries often suffer from the 
development of a dictatorial ruling elite and an overdependence on oil. Subsequently, these 
countries lack the proper institutions to develop a domestic investment environment due to their 
exclusive reliance on their natural resources to maintain their economy (Jones & Weinthal, 
2011).  
Frank et al. (2009) and Warner (2001) establish that a country’s dependence on natural 
resources does not often result in economic success but more often results in the development of 
autocratic governance. Franke et al. outline the benefits of oil revenue, as it provides a country 
with autonomy from a taxation dependence due to the already sufficient income. Franke et al. 
also draw direct connections between Kazakhstan's resource revenue and the likelihood of 
autocratic stability (Franke et al., 2009). Warner cites the absence of a correlation between GDP 
and natural resources, using this as support to definitively confirm that natural resources harm 
economic growth (Warner, 2001). The findings in this literature in no way doom any resource-
rich developing country despite the high correlation found between these deficiencies and 
resource-rich countries.  
Pauline Jones, among other scholars, leads the counter-literature, stating that a country 
with vast natural resources, such as Kazakhstan, is not necessarily condemned to poor 
institutional development. Her research uses an economic lens to debate the myths of the 
resource curse. She states that the ownership structures of the Central Asian countries are more 
to blame than their resource abundance for their poor institutional development. Supporting 
scholars emphasize the potential for resource-rich countries to develop into strong, balanced 
states if there is a will and ability to develop a profitable investment climate (Jones & Weinthal, 
2011). Jones bases her research on a large case study into resource-rich post-Soviet countries and 
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concludes that ownership structure is the key variable in mediating mineral wealth and 
institutional outcomes. Her literature points to the various third variables that are often ignored 
when establishing the direct relationship between oil and authoritarianism. Traditionally, 
resource curse scholars such as Franke et al. focus on institutional deficiencies or lack of access. 
However, Jones emphasizes the need to also take historical, cultural, and geographical factors 
into account in data sets. Another weakness of the confirmatory resource curse debate is the 
failure to provide evidence outside of such a narrow time period, 1960-1990. Jones concludes 
that oil is not a curse, but it can be an obstacle to state advancement due to the ease of falling 
back on oil revenue. Sabna Ali and her co-authors (2019) further researched the relationship 
between natural resources and state structures, but focused on welfare measures through the 
connection between happiness and resource wealth. Their findings established overall resource 
wealth generally cannot be correlated with low levels of happiness, but found significant 
negative correlation between (oil) resource wealth and happiness when a country’s resources are 
primarily oil based. This literature adopts a newer, conditional approach to the resource curse, 
providing modern researchers the ability to explore the development of Central Asia and 
Kazakhstan in a wider scope.  
In this thesis, I address both sides of the resource curse debate and acknowledge that 
Kazakhstan’s domestic setbacks are in part a result of the available abundance of natural 
resources within the Kazakh borders. However, I make the conclusion that these resources have 
enabled them to advance a variety of international economic relationships, using these natural 
resources as leverage. I additionally will answer whether modern Kazakhstan has the potential to 
advance into a more responsive and a developed country despite its ingrained foreign-
investment-oriented natural resource ownership structure. 
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B. Kazakhstan-Russia Dependency  
When researching post-Soviet countries, the issue of Russian dominance is a commonly 
debated subject. Much of the surrounding literature regarding Central Asia after 1991 debates the 
possibility for the region to achieve true independence from Russia. Scholars Khan and Owen 
argue that Russia’s influence in Central Asia accounts for a large portion of the area’s 
international engagement. Khan specifically indicates that any international engagement in 
Central Asia is due to Moscow’s desire for strategic control. Owen et al. (2019) further Khan’s 
point in explaining that in current international relations, Russia is using its imperialistic history 
in the region as a platform to advance and increase Russian dominance. Owen et al. compare 
Russia’s actions in the area to that of the United States’ past ventures and moderate imperialism 
in its close geographic neighbors, such as countries in Central America. Warner’s research 
expands on this subject and explains that Moscow views Central Asia as its own “strategic 
sphere of influence”, indicating Russia’s possessive view of the area (Warner, 2001). An 
unintended consequence of the continued Russian dominance Owen et al. (2019) states is that 
Central Asian citizens are simultaneously “caught between the deep sociocultural ties that come 
with decades of socialization into Russian cultural practices and a growing distaste for Russia as 
a political entity.” This acknowledges the complex but deep connection between Kazakhstan and 
Russia and Owen et al. cite this link as evidence of the impossibility of Kazakhstan’s future 
sovereignty. Owen et al., Warner and Khan establish that Russia’s interest in Central Asia will 
supersede Kazakhstan’s efforts to increase its sovereignty.   
Historically, Russia used its relationship with Central Asia to promote its “Europeanness” to 
the international community through emphasizing the differences between Russia and the 
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Central Asian states. However, Buranelli (2014) explains that this attempt only distanced Russia 
from its aspired title of a European state, making this specific Russian strategy in Central Asian 
null. This past plan emphasized areas of cultural and political separation between Russia and 
Central Asian countries. Buranelli’s analysis of Russia’s goals in the area highlight Russia’s lack 
of genuine interest in Central Asia beyond that of economic and political control.  
Further supporting the argument surrounding Central Asia’s potential achievement of 
sovereignty, Roy Allison (2004) describes the increasing agency in the region and cites it as 
evidence that Kazakhstan is moving beyond helpless dependency. Allison acknowledges the 
increasing importance of the Central Asian region in today’s politics. In doing so, he comments 
on Russia’s modern policy efforts in the region—how Putin is motivated to pursue various 
vectors of collaboration to establish a stronger presence beyond that of the West or other 
countries. These efforts again confirm the surface level motivations of Russia in the region. 
Russia is inevitably one of Kazakhstan’s primary international partners, but it is not a partnership 
of exclusivity and it cannot deny Kazakhstan its own sovereignty, despite its motives in the 
region.  
In a more modern development, Ziegler (2014) supplements Allison’s argument and 
acknowledges that in the realistic future, China is positioned to succeed past any ability of Russia 
to continue its lightweight colonization efforts. Ziegler further notes that the annexation of the 
Crimea serves as an event critical to motivating Kazakhstan’s actions due to the similarities 
between the Crimea and Northern Kazakhstan, such as both regions’ dominant Russian minority. 
Thus, Ziegler rationalizes Kazakhstan’s actions to align with other powerful actors. I assert that 
Nazarbayev’s goals for Kazakhstan recognize the need for fortified security and that Nazarbayev 
has sought to make Kazakhstan a location for viable competition between international partners, 
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an effort that has successfully granted it significant autonomy from Russia and Russian 
influence.  
 
C. Value of Reputational Security 
Reputational security is one of the major foundations of international relations scholarship 
and is often discussed in the context of post-Soviet states. The concept of reputational security 
emphasizes its importance to a country’s overall national security endeavors and policies. I have 
collected a variety of sources that provide evidence for the value of sovereignty and subsequent 
recognized legitimacy of a country by the international community, as the term is applied to 
international relations (Keohane, 1999; Sartori, 1998; Cull, 2018; Ziegler, 2014). A 
“reputational-based security” is defined as “the degree of safety accruing to a nation state that 
proceeds from being known by citizens of other nations” (Cull, 2018).  
Robert Keohane notes that a country’s reputation and the importance it holds in the 
international community is a result of the capability that reputation has to shape international 
perspective. Furthermore, he states that when a country gains a particular reputation, that 
reputation will follow the country for a long time. He argues that a reputation of keeping 
agreements, one of aggressive self-interest, or one of toughness can all be useful depending on a 
country’s ultimate goal (Keonhane, 1999). Furthermore, Anne Sartori (1998) analyzes the power 
of reputation in diplomacy and warns that a reputation received by a country can greatly impact 
that country’s future diplomatic efforts and collaborations due to the historical longevity of a 
reputation. Throughout my analysis I emphasize that the early efforts of Kazakhstan to develop a 
positive and dependable reputation helped it to facilitate positive diplomatic engagements in the 
international community.  
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The literature reflects the importance of reputational security for countries that are 
surrounded by other countries that may not respect borders. As a post-Soviet state, Kazakhstan 
maintains precarious sovereignty while Russia looms close by. The independence of post-Soviet 
Central Asian states is particularly insecure given the historical colonization by Russia in the 18th 
and 19th centuries and their previous lack of independence (Pomfret & Anderson, 2001). The 
annexation of the Crimea by Russia is a cause to elicit concern from other countries with large 
Russian minorities, such as Northern Kazakhstan (“The World Factbook: Kazakhstan”; Ziegler, 
2014). I address this factor and use it as evidence to reiterate the importance of Kazakhstan’s 
international collaboration and development of other strong partnerships.    
Cull (2018) also addresses the importance of increasing foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
weaker states as a way of advancing reputational security. In his application of reputational 
security in Kazakhstan he declares “Nazarbayev’s international motives, while economically 
based, have also been an effort to establish legitimacy on an international scale” (Cull, 2018). 
The need for reputational security originated from the growing practice of covering and 
analyzing international relations news on media platforms, as the greater the importance of a 
country to international relations, the more it appears in international media. Cull confirms the 
importance of international reputation by determining that if a country is able to garner 
acceptance on an international scale, it is less likely to be invaded by its neighbors (Cull, 2019). 
Cull (2019) emphasizes that foreign public engagement is the best possible way to develop and 
grow a country’s reputation and therefore its security. In Cull’s definition of reputational 
security, international recognition and respect of a country’s boundaries improve and protect the 
global community’s diplomatic investment through ensuring a country’s long-term existence. 
Cull ultimately concedes that it is a difficult concept to quantitatively measure, but it is possible 
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to observe and analyze a country’s ability to cultivate international reputation through the variety 
of avenues that I have previously mentioned (Cull, 2019).    
The better a country is known on an international scale, the less likely that it will fall victim 
to uncontested absorption into a larger, more powerful country. Kazakhstan’s membership in 
international organizations, the UNSC and WTO, confirm the expansion of Kazakhstan’s 
international recognition and help to assure its positioning as an important world leader. This 
lends Kazakhstan significant defensive security as well as economic gain.   
 
D. What is Modern Sovereignty?  
Sovereignty is a heavily debated topic in international relations literature. There are a variety 
of “types” of sovereignty and a country can qualify as sovereign through one definition but fail 
to achieve another, and these definitions are further differentiated in different historical times 
(Krasner, 2001). Nicholas Cull (2018) states that a modern sovereign state is one that is accepted 
on an international scale as “legitimately sovereign” over its territory, which he qualifies as a 
country’s ability to be seen and appreciated in the international community (Cull, 2018). 
However, contradicting Cull, Stephen Krasner argues that the rulers of a country are the actors 
that have the most control and determination over their own and other country’s sovereignty. He 
supports his argument by emphasizing the ruler’s ability to recognize other states as well as deny 
any established boundaries (Krasner, 2001). This thesis argues that President Nazarbayev has 
played a significant role in increasing Kazakhstan’s sovereignty from Russia, and thus, 
examination of his role helps to prove the importance of a country’s leader to its sovereignty.  
Historically, countries previously incorporated in larger empires, such as the USSR, have 
difficulty establishing sovereignty after the dissolution of the empire. In 1991, the sudden break-
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up of the Soviet Union left many Soviet satellite states in an insecure position between 
independent and still reliant on transactions that occurred within the previous states of the USSR. 
They each lacked complete control over their territories due to the remnants of Soviet dominance 
within their new borders. In considering the example of the Crimean annexation, the Russian 
government justifies its actions in the post-soviet spaces as ‘near abroad.’ “Near abroad” most 
often refers to the newly independent republics that are of political interest to Russia (Safire, 
1994). Russia uses this terminology to legitimize its advances in the region and to equate its 
actions to Western geopolitical ventures (Wittke, 2018). In this reflection on Russian policy, 
Wittke notes that sovereignty in the post-Soviet space is actually contextual due to the remaining 
interconnectedness that exists between Russia and various post-Soviet states.  
Stephen Krasner’s comprehensive work on the subject of sovereignty expands upon Wittke’s 
reflection as he outlines four different types of sovereignty. Krasner supports the statements from 
Keohane and Sartori in the previous section about the importance of reputation to a country’s 
international positioning. He further establishes that recognition is a critical aspect of 
maintaining international legal sovereignty (Krasner, 2001). International legal sovereignty 
refers to the capability of a country to be recognized as in control of its judicial and legal affairs.  
This thesis contests Kazakhstan’s achievement of interdependence sovereignty, which 
Krasner defines as “the ability of public authorities to regulate the flow of information, goods, 
people, pollutants, or capitol across the borders of their state” (Krasner, 2001). For the purpose 
of this thesis, all mention of sovereignty will be based on this definition. I have chosen to 
analyze this specific definition of sovereignty because it best represents the situation of 
Kazakhstan’s sovereignty, or lack thereof, from Russia. I establish that Nazarbayev understood 
the detailed metrics of interdependence sovereignty and understood where he could not 
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originally ensure Kazakhstan’s sovereignty. He has now pursued a variety of initiatives aimed at 
increasing Kazakhstan interdependence sovereignty, ultimately solidifying Kazakhstan’s official 




This chapter presented important context on Kazakhstan’s background and group relationship 
with the other Central Asian states. Their collaboration and shared history with Russia serve to 
further differentiate Kazakhstan’s modern path and foreign policy initiatives. In the rest of this 
thesis, I will detail the three specific foreign policy areas where Kazakhstan has excelled and 
developed a variety of ways to achieve independence from Russia.  
In Chapter two, I analyze Kazakhstan’s leadership in international organizations and 
initiatives. I do this by outlining Kazakhstan’s past cooperation in the Nunn-Lugar Threat 
Reduction Program, their temporary membership in the United Nations Security Council, and 
their recent inclusion into the World Trade Organization. I use Kazakhstan’s recurrent 
aspirations to cooperate with the international community as evidence to support my analysis of 
their success in this initiative. 
 In Chapter three, I discuss Kazakhstan’s economic collaboration with China to build 
critical infrastructure for Kazakhstan’s rapidly expanding economy. China recently announced 
its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, and through joint collaboration the Sino-Kazakh 
partnership has united the two countries to build critical economic and transport infrastructure 
within Kazakhstan.  
 In Chapter tour, I detail and analyze the reform of the Kazakh higher education system, 
including the internationalization of their research capabilities. Higher education and research 
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capabilities have become critical to a country’s advancement in the modern international 
community and Kazakhstan’s robust reforms and international collaboration programs will help 
Kazakhstan attain its goal of advanced geopolitical positioning.  
In the last chapter, I conclude and combine my research and argumentation to draw upon 
Kazakhstan’s ambitious reforms and address the geopolitical future of Kazakhstan in the context 
of its foreign and domestic development goals. I specifically draw upon the provisions set in 
Kazakhstan’s most recent government goal, the Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy. Given the discussion 
throughout my thesis, I hypothesize about Kazakhstan’s capability to meet its most ambitious 
initiatives. I additionally discuss the importance of this topic for the United States’ security 
concerns and make recommendations for future U.S. policy in the area.  
In each chapter, each sector will be evaluated with specific metrics of success delineated 
from the Kazakh government’s initiatives and goals. Each chapter concludes with analysis that 
supports the conclusion that Kazakhstan’s outwardly focused foreign policy has enabled it, in 
many courses, to establish its modern independence and autonomy from Russia.  
  
 
    21 





Since independence in 1991, Kazakhstan has significantly benefitted from the ambitious 
foreign policy of President Nazarbayev. In 1990, on the cusp of independence, the Central Asian 
republics signed the first treaty of the region and Kazakhstan was deemed the official head of the 
cohort, demonstrating leadership from Kazakhstan’s inception (Sovereignty After Empire: 
Comparing the Middle East and Central Asia). Outside of Central Asia, Nazarbayev has played 
an important role in the international community on issues such as international security and 
economic collaboration. His leadership in the Nunn-Lugar program in 1992 originally propelled 
him to a place of recognition in the international security field. As Kazakhstan’s first president, 
he expanded Kazakh international integration and pursued leadership in regional organizations, 
as well as promoting Kazakhstan’s membership in more prestigious international organizations 
such as the United Nations and World Trade Organization. Through multilateral engagement, 
Kazakhstan propelled itself into a position of international recognition, where it has greater 
visibility and there is more potential for partners to take interest in continued Kazakh security 
and sovereignty from Russia’s dominating regional influence.  
 
A. Reputational Security Recap 
 
Reputational-based security is a concept that is critical to the argument of this thesis and 
more specifically, this chapter. It has previously been defined as “the degree of safety accruing to 
a nation state that proceeds from being known by citizens of other nations” (Cull, 2018).  
Reputational security can be acquired through both positive and negative international 
acknowledgement, from events such as providing aid to international organizations or a country 
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going to war. A country that is respected on an international scale is seen as “legitimately 
sovereign” over its territory (Cull, 2018). Working towards reputational security is especially 
useful for newer countries in geopolitically important areas, as it increases the security of their 
borders from potential aggressive geographic neighbors. 
Kazakhstan has effectively established itself as a country deserving of international 
recognition. Kazakhstan’s original participation in the Nunn-Lugar non-proliferation efforts and 
its memberships in the UNSC, WTO and CICA created various new opportunities for 
Kazakhstan to connect with countries outside the post-Soviet space and international 
organizations. These relationships helped Nazarbayev’s goals of reputational security and further 
provided a diversity of partnerships and resources that have helped to legitimize Kazakhstan’s 
sovereignty from Russia.  
This chapter will analyze areas of Kazakhstan’s demonstrated international leadership and 
characterize the country’s resulting reputation among the international community. I argue that 
Kazakhstan has gone to significant efforts to prioritize its participation as an actor in the 
international community, specifically regarding international security. Additionally, I argue these 
efforts have gained Kazakhstan recognition while simultaneously providing the state with 
security. Thus, through achieving international recognition and inserting itself into international 
affairs, Kazakhstan has gained value as a participant in the international community in addition 
to increasing its legitimate sovereignty as a country.  
 
B. Metrics to Determine Successful Achievement in Reputational Security 
 
Kazakhstan’s goals motivating its participation in international organizations varies 
depending on the specific organization or project, but often focuses on advancing its global 
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partnerships. Despite limited official declaration records of Kazakhstan’s goal of international 
recognition, I use a compilation of Nazarbayev’s speeches between 1997 and 2014 to assert that 
Kazakhstan aims to achieve a balance of positive relations with the world’s major powers and 
the country’s regional neighbors (Ambrosio & Lange, 2014). The multilateral foreign policy 
strategy that Kazakhstan pursues fulfills both of these goals. Furthermore, a variety of 
government addresses from 2002, 2007, and 2012 reflect Kazakhstan’s desire to develop 
multilateral cooperation with the United States and European Union in addition to its traditional 
geopolitical partners Russia and China (Ambrosio & Lange, 2014).  
Engvall (2015) states that Nazarbayev “has expressed a clear logic: to develop a role as a 
respectable international citizen that can be a pragmatic partner with all quarters of the globe.” 
The aspiration for Kazakhstan to be a pragmatic partner “with all quarters of the globe” reflects 
the Kazakh government’s commitment to seeking mutual support from a variety of international 
bodies, both states and organizations. This goal contextualizes Kazakhstan’s collaborative 
outward actions and desire to engage in mutual support on a variety of different projects. In a 
speech in 2012, Nazarbayev emphasized the importance of international cooperation and 
announces, “We are ready to extend our cooperation on all questions and problems of regional 
security, within the frameworks of CSTO, SCO, CICA as well as with partner programs such as 
NATO and different international organizations” (Nazarbayev, 2012). 
<<“Мы готовы углублять наше взаимодействие по всем вопросам и проблемам 
региональной безопасности, в том числе в рамках ОДКБ, ШОС, СВМДА, а также 
партнерских программ с НАТО и другими международными структурами” >> 
 
Nazarbayev’s statement recognizes the importance of international collaboration and 
champions Kazakhstan’s preparedness to advance this goal. I argue that Nazarbayev’s statements 
and the accumulated evidence of his motives collectively outline Kazakhstan’s goals for its own 
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international collaboration, and that this outline can be used to measure the success of 
Kazakhstan’s accomplishments.   
 
II. The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Plan 
 
Kazakhstan has been a strong advocate for international nuclear non-proliferation since 
its independence. After the fall of the USSR, many of the Soviet satellite states were left with 
massive stockpiles of nuclear weapons. The breakup of the Soviet Union resulted in an increased 
number of nuclear-armed countries in the world and 15 weapons facilities, nuclear stockpiles and 
test sites remained in Kazakhstan, making it a de facto nuclear state (“Fact Sheet: The Nunn-
Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program”). The nuclear arms left in newly independent 
countries was a threat to international security, as nuclear power is especially dangerous in the 
hands of a politically unstable new country (“Fact Sheet: The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat 
Reduction Program”). Two US senators, Richard Lugar and Sam Nunn, initiated a large-scale 
de-nuclearization program, today recognized as the Nunn-Lugar program, although it was 
previously known as the US-Russia Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (“The Nunn-Lugar 
Project”). Ukraine and Belarus were also part of the program, as there were nuclear weapons left 
within their borders as well (“The Nunn-Lugar Project”). The map below shows the extent to 
which Kazakhstan was weaponized during Soviet times (Abzhaparova, 2011). 
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Figure 2.1: Map of Kazakhstan’s Nuclear Resources in 19913  
Figure 2 
Nuclear countries can use their access to nuclear weapons as a method of enforcing the 
strength of their borders from potential aggressors, as nuclear weapons are a powerful deterrent 
to potential invaders. However, despite the strong negotiating capabilities of nuclear countries, 
Nazarbayev collaborated with both Russia and the United States to remove all nuclear and 
biological weapons from Kazakhstan (Sidel & Levy, 2007). This initiative demonstrated 
Nazarbayev’s critical leadership and helped develop what was the beginning of a strategic 
foreign policy plan. The renouncement of Kazakhstan’s nuclear stockpile served to signal to 
many Western countries that Kazakhstan was a politically mature landscape. By showing 
leadership in this peace-motivated program, Kazakhstan gained international recognition as a 
country that prioritized stability in international security, which greatly helped to spur economic 
interest in the country. 
 
3 This map of Kazakhstan shows the various nuclear stockpiles, test sites, and weapons bases that were within its 
borders in 1991 after the fall of the Soviet Union (Abzhaparova, 2011). 
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Together, Russia, the United States, and Kazakhstan developed a plan to denuclearize and 
close all stockpiles of nuclear and biological weapons left in Kazakhstan. For Kazakhstan to hold 
such a critical role in ensuring international security was monumental because of the tendency of 
many post-Soviet countries to reject opportunities for international collaboration, as was the case 
in Uzbekistan. In a previously classified document, Nazarbayev states, “Kazakhstan guarantees 
the carrying out of the elimination of all kinds of nuclear weapons” (Nazarbayev, 1992). This 
plan provided Kazakhstan an early opportunity to gain international recognition in the diplomatic 
community. Nazarbayev continued this leadership approach throughout his presidency through 
engagement and collaboration with world powers and international organizations.  
Moreover, denuclearization increased Kazakhstan’s sovereignty outside the limits of just 
making a name for itself in the international community. Removing Soviet weapons from within 
its borders symbolically aligned with the policy of de-Sovietisation, meaning that Kazakhstan 
implemented a variety of social and political policies to lessen and remove the Soviet presence in 
Kazakhstan. The term “de-Sovietisation” categorizes attempts of post-Soviet countries to 
establish themselves as sovereign from Russia through actions distancing themselves from 
Soviet traditions, actions and, in this case, weapons (Abzhaparova, 2011). In denying the 
opportunity to become a nuclear state, Kazakhstan further differentiated itself from the 
“aggressive” and “militaristic” USSR, creating its own labels of “denuclearized” and “peaceful” 
(Abzhaparova, 2011). This differentiation helped to distinguish the newly independent 
Kazakhstan from Russia and other Central Asian countries on an international scale. 
Kazakhstan’s ability to redefine itself after independence has greatly contributed to its ultimate 
achievement of sovereignty from Russia.  
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III. The United Nations Security Council 
 
Early in Kazakhstan’s independence, Nazarbayev expressed interest in acquiring non-
permanent member status on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Many of 
Kazakhstan’s past initiatives and endorsements were aimed to establish itself as a worthy 
candidate for this position. These efforts ranged from the previously mentioned advocacy for 
nuclear disarmament, to stronger Eurasian economic and political integration (Engvall, 2015). 
A contributing factor to Kazakhstan’s eventual membership was Kazakhstan’s initiative 
in the creation of the Conference Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA). 
Nazarbayev proposed the idea for this inter-governmental organization that would deal with 
important foreign relations between Asian countries. Kazakhstan’s leadership on this project 
demonstrated a commitment to regional security and was internationally recognized as a bold 
undertaking in 1992 by a country that was seen as less dominant than Russia (Engvall, 2015).  
While CICA was developed in the 1990s, it progressively gained legitimacy through 
extended membership and recognition. CICA summits were held about every two years among 
its growing membership that today includes 27 countries across Asia. The primary goal of joint-
peace stability and cooperation persists under Kazakhstan’s original goal (S-CICA: About 
CICA). This organization’s growth served to boost the image of Kazakhstan’s leadership 
capacity on an international scale and enabled Kazakhstan to be seen as a window to the rest of 
Central Asia (Engvall, 2015). Additionally, this leadership helped Nazarbayev acquire the 
position of Central Asia’s Statesman. This title is earned by the Central Asian leader that has the 
most influence or perceived power in the international community and they act as a 
representative for the region and since independence, Nazarbayev has occupied this role 
(McGlinchey, 2019). CICA and Kazakhstan’s demonstrated leadership in the region were among 
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the primary considerations taken into account when contemplating Kazakhstan as a non-
permanent member of the UN Security Council (S-CICA: About CICA).  
Nazarbayev’s success in winning the bid for non-permanent membership in the UNSC in 
2017 was a new step for Kazakhstan’s foreign involvement. After Kazakhstan secured this 
leadership position in such a widely recognized organization, Kazakhstan demonstrated what 
Engvall (2015) states as “the ultimate commitment to its goal.” Through the accomplishment of 
membership in such a powerful international organization, Nazarbayev was able to demonstrate 
Kazakhstan’s power and legitimacy to Kazakh citizens and the foreign community. Kazakhstan 
was developing itself as a legitimate international citizen and pragmatic partner. Kazakhstan was 
the first Central Asian country - and so far only - to gain a seat on the UNSC (Sanchez, 2018), 
and when highlighting this decision, Nazarbayev boasted that this action demonstrated trust in 
Kazakhstan to solve the world’s problems (Nazarbayev, 2018b).  
Throughout its two-year term on the UNSC, Kazakhstan advocated for the general 
interests of Central Asian countries in addition to encouraging support of UNSC projects and 
launched the UN Code of Conduct towards Achieving a World Free of Terrorism by 2045 
(Vassilenko, 2019). Nazarbayev advocated to many countries for the support of this Code of 
Conduct by way of public speeches and meetings with state officials. Ultimately, Kazakhstan 
was able to garner written support from 78 countries as of March 2019 (Sanchez, 2018). While 
promoting international security and Eurasian integration, Nazarbayev achieved his long-term 
goal of international visibility through Kazakhstan’s non-permanent seat at the UNSC (Engvall, 
2015). 
 
IV. The World Trade Organization 
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The recent inclusion of Kazakhstan into the World Trade Organization (WTO) has 
provided another opportunity for Kazakhstan to advance its international recognition and 
participation in the international community. Since 1996, the WTO has been evaluating 
Kazakhstan’s readiness for membership. On November 30, 2015, the institution decided that 
Kazakhstan’s accession package met the necessary requirements of membership (Kourmanova, 
2015). Even so, 90% of Kazakhstan’s trade was already with WTO members in 2015 (Coyer, 
2015).  
Achievement of WTO membership recognizes Nazarbayev’s extensive efforts and 
commitment to the process of accession and provides a multitude of new opportunities for global 
economic integration. The WTO accession program ultimately improved Kazakhstan’s 
investment climate but required significant reforms to Kazakhstan’s economy. The in-depth 
negotiations for membership spanned a full 19 years. The accession conditions qualified 
Kazakhstan as a developed country due to its high GDP. Yet this qualification prohibits the 
country from significant aid that is provided by the WTO to “developing” countries 
(Amirbekova, 2017). Certain conditions of the accession placed limitations on Kazakhstan’s 
previous import and export practices and have enforced new restrictions elsewhere in the Kazakh 
economy. These conditions help to confirm that the same economic policies are followed 
throughout the WTO Member States.  
Before approving membership for any country, the stated goal of the WTO is to develop 
a cohesive plan to best adapt the countries’ economic institutions to WTO standards. The WTO’s 
agreement with Kazakhstan specifically eliminates quotas for the metallurgy industry. The 
absence of protective duties has created competitive prices for the metallurgy products, creating 
new markets for Kazakh export. This development is only a single example of the expected new 
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market opportunities, according to an analysis of the expected changes in Kazakh exports 
(Amirbekova, 2017). The expansion of market opportunities will continuously help Kazakhstan 
to diversify its economic partners and simultaneously decrease its overdependence on Russian 
economic assistance.  
Countries that enter the WTO as a “developing” country receive aid to assist the 
country’s integration into the organization. Kazakhstan’s qualification as a “developed” country 
disqualified it for WTO aid and the required WTO reforms drew attention to critical areas of the 
country’s development. Those critical areas were Kazakhstan’s export industry and its previous 
methods of implementation for regulations and required reforms. These are areas Kazakhstan 
still has to improve upon to succeed and meet the standards of the WTO. The WTO has provided 
Kazakhstan with opportunities for new markets and increased exports, but the regulations 
required by the WTO have also limited the growth of other economic sectors due to certain 
WTO-enforced limits on production. Despite the required reforms, this membership has 
bolstered Kazakh economic capacity and improved Kazakhstan’s perceived reliability in the 
international system. The WTO knowingly holds its member states to specific standards and 
guidelines and since Kazakhstan became a member, it can be assured that it is a more dependable 
investment environment (“Understanding the WTO – Standards and Safety”). Furthermore, 
WTO membership has increased Kazakhstan’s ability to engage in international discussions and 
policy implementation. 
The accession of the WTO has provided Nazarbayev more leverage as an internationally 
respected country and has widened the opportunity for foreign partnerships by also expanding 
Kazakhstan’s network of investors. The country continues to pursue an active role in the 
organization with hopes of spurring greater global interest in Kazakhstan’s economic institutions 
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and natural resources. The 2020 WTO ministerial conference is set to be held in Kazakhstan’s 
Capitol, Nur-Sultan, and is expected to host 4000-5000 people ("POLITICS & SOCIETY; WTO 
Ministerial Conference to be Held in Nur-Sultan in June 2020"). The high level of involvement 
ok Kazakhstan in the WTO is both a move to increase the relevance of the country on a global 
scale, and a strategic way of hosting members from all 168 Member States of the WTO. This 
engagement turns the future conference into a chance for Kazakhstan to uphold its reputation as 
an internationally engaged country and attract interest of more foreign investors/partnerships. 
Kazakhstan’s WTO membership has helped contribute to the success of Nazarbayev’s goals of 




Kazakhstan has successfully established itself as a strong, reliable member of 
international institutions and as a leader in its geographic area – a country deserving of 
international recognition. Through gaining membership in respected international organizations, 
it has expanded its network to new international organizations and countries. Kazakhstan 
strategically maneuvered its foreign policy and now occupies an important role in the 
international community. This accomplishment both fulfills Nazarbayev’s goals for the country 
and helps to provide an extra layer of security to Kazakhstan’s autonomy, due to its elevated 
presence in the global community.  
Kazakhstan’s diplomatic strengths, alongside its support of international institutional 
membership, have contributed to the success of Nazarbayev’s achievement goals – to gain 
international relevance and to develop a reputation as a strong, autonomous country. Finally, I 
have confirmed that these accomplishments affirm Nazarbayev’s stated reputational ambitions 
 
    32 
and greatly benefit Kazakhstan’s economic and defense positioning because of the stated utility 
of reputational security.  
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Chapter Three: The Critical Contributions of the Sino-Kazakh Strategic Partnership 
 
I. Introduction  
 
After the fall of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan lacked the critical economic and 
developmental infrastructure necessary to effectively take advantage of domestic natural 
resources. Due to this absence of infrastructure, Nazarbayev began to reach out to foreign 
investors and countries outside of the former USSR to offset lost economic infrastructure and 
help it grow its natural resource economy (Chang & Kassymbekova, 2012). Nazarbayev 
established a new relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) that has been critical 
to Kazakhstan’s progress towards its goals. In January 1992, the two countries officially agreed 
to a diplomatic relationship of friendship and cooperation. These early agreements originally 
developed because of the similarities in terrain and culture in the Western Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region (XUAR) that spanned both China and the edge of Kazakhstan’s Eastern 
border (Akataeva, 2006; Álvarez, 2015). 
A strategic partnership between Kazakhstan and China was developed throughout a series 
of collaborative economic projects and pursuits. For example, the official establishment of a 
diplomatic relationship in 1992 was one of the first definitive commitments between China and 
newly independent Kazakhstan. However, 1997 marked the beginning of a more serious 
relationship due to China’s President, Li Peng’s, determination and massive investment in 
Kazakhstan’s AktobeMunaiGas company at the time (Kembayev, 2018 ).  
While China was making significant investments in Kazakhstan, the late 1990s saw a 
relaxation of Russia-Kazakhstan relations as Russia lessened previously heavy-handed Soviet 
economic and political control. This made the budding China-Kazakhstan relationship grow even 
stronger. China became a critical partner for Kazakhstan, and their bilateral relationship of 
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occasional collaboration grew into what is now a strategic partnership dependent on mutual 
economic and infrastructural aid. The modern strategic partnership has grown to incorporate 
economic, infrastructural, and social collaboration. The countries’ partnership today stands to 
threaten Russia’s influence in Kazakhstan and the greater Central Asian region (Álvarez, 2015).  
 This chapter will detail and analyze the various sectors that have benefited due to the 
Chinese-Kazakh partnership. I argue that this partnership enables Kazakhstan to evade 
significant Russian dependence. The partnership also facilitates growth through the development 
of economic infrastructure, the increased access to a massive new market for Kazakhstan’s 
natural resources, and the construction of major infrastructure within Kazakhstan that increases 
their output potential. Kazakhstan’s resources are among China’s highest imports (Kembayev, 
2018). Additionally, China and Kazakhstan mutually gain from this partnership, as they stand 
together on important political issues such as terrorism, secularism and border security. 
 
A. Multi-vectored Foreign Policy and Metrics to Determine Successful Achievement in 
Economic Development 
 
In order to understand the metrics I am using to measure the success and effectiveness of the 
Sino-Kazakh relationship, it is essential to define Kazakhstan’s multi-vectored foreign policy and 
analyze statements from various Kazakh government addresses.  
Kazakhstan’s foreign policy strategy is vital to maneuvering its geopolitical situation. It is the 
largest landlocked country in the world and bordered by two of the world’s strongest 
superpowers, Russia and China. Nazarbayev understood that cooperative relations with 
surrounding countries was and is critical to maintain control in the region and ongoing 
collaboration with each individual country (Clarke, 2015). For the purpose of this chapter, 
various aspects of Kazakhstan’s multi-vectored foreign policy will be analyzed through its role 
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in Chinese relations. Kazakhstan’s partnership with China occupies a large space in 
Kazakhstan’s foreign policy, but every other individual foreign relationship is critical and 
continuously maintained for the economic aid and security that it provides Kazakhstan. 
The current relationship between Kazakhstan and China is made possible because of 
Kazakhstan’s strategy of multi-vectored foreign policy. This approach to foreign policy is a 
continued development from early Kazakh independence. A country that multi-vectored foreign 
policy separates its foreign relations with each partner country into “vectors” that are then 
differentiated further and represent the different aspects of the relationship (economic, political, 
security). The country, in this case Kazakhstan, then balances each individual vector with the 
others in order to avoid conflict. A multi-vectored foreign policy enables a country to balance 
alliances between multiple, potentially conflicting, superpowers. Kazakhstan accomplishes this 
by keeping its relationships with each ally separate (Koch, 2013). For Kazakhstan, the primary 
countries that have conflicting interests are China, Russia, and the United States because of their 
vastly different economic, political, and ideological goals. Multi-vectorism is a strategy that has 
enabled Kazakhstan to develop multiple foreign policy pillars with each country, both 
economically and politically, while making sure to not prioritize one over the other (Engvall, 
2015). Kazakhstan is dependent on economic aid from a multitude of competing countries and is 
able to achieve harmonious individual partnerships through balancing its various vectors with 
each country.  
China has been able to contribute significantly to Kazakhstan’s infrastructural development, 
and this aid is directly aligned with Nazarbayev’s commitment to building up Kazakhstan’s 
capacity for trade. This motivation is evident in a government address where Nazarbayev calls 
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for a continued development of resource potential, and he specifically names his intention to 
“improve quality of transportation and logistics infrastructure” (Nazarbayev, 2018a).  
Kazakhstan’s multi-vectored foreign policy facilitates Kazakhstan’s aforementioned goal 
of maintaining positive relations with its international partners. In a variety of Nazarbayev’s 
addresses, the trading opportunities that China’s market enables and its ability to provide 
Kazakhstan with the necessary infrastructural resources are highlighted as motivating aspects for 
continued partnership with China (Ambrosia & Lange, 2014). This chapter argues that China is 
the primary foreign partner that assists Kazakhstan’s economic and infrastructural goals. 
The ultimate strategy of this multi-vectored foreign policy in the economy is to maintain 
productive partnerships with traditionally competing countries that play essential roles in various 
areas of Kazakhstan’s development. Overall, there is not a specified goal to minimize 
Kazakhstan’s dependence on just one country, but this strategy has been essential in 
Kazakhstan’s increasing sovereignty.  
China’s increased presence in Kazakhstan’s development has largely helped to offset 
Kazakhstan’s dependence on Russian resources and aid, thus serving to decrease the intensity of 
the Russia-Kazakhstan economic vector. The specificities of Kazakhstan’s successes with China 
will outlined throughout the rest of the chapter through detailed analysis of Sino-Kazakh 
economic collaboration, trade metrics, and their shared memberships in economic and political 
organizations.  
 
II. The Economic Role of China in Kazakhstan 
 
China is one of the world’s largest economies and is the world’s largest exporter 
(excluding the EU), and this economic powerhouse has become deeply ingrained in a partnership 
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with Kazakhstan through classic economic relations including export, import, and infrastructural 
development in the region (“Trade Statistics by Country / Region”). China has constructed 
significant transportation infrastructure in Kazakhstan to further its economic and international 
ambitions. Before this, Kazakhstan did not have a viable transportation network, making China’s 
contributions critical to development.  
Figure 3.1 below shows the exports of Kazakhstan to China and the imports from China to 
Kazakhstan. It also demonstrates the growth in their economic activity over the years, and its 




Figure 3.1: Graph of Kazakh exports to China and Kazakh imports from China4 
Figure 3 
Specifically, in 2017, Kazakhstan exported a total of 5.86 billion dollars of its overall 44.1 
billion dollar export total to China (“OEC - Kazakhstan (KAZ) Exports, Imports, and Trade 
Partners”). These statistics demonstrate the importance of Kazakhstan’s role in the international 
economy and demonstrate the interconnectedness of Kazakhstan and China’s economies. In 
2015, Kazakhstan managed to achieve a positive trade balance of 110 million between its 
imports and exports with China. This positive trade balance is evident in Figure 3.1 above and 
 
4 The blue line represents the exports of Kazakhstan to China, between 1995 and 2015, and the red line represents 
the imports from China during the same time span (Choi, 2019).  
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was a huge accomplishment when compared to the data from the beginning of the Sino-Kazakh 
trade relationship (Choi, 2019). 
China took an early interest in Kazakhstan. In 1997, China made its largest investment 
abroad when it bought a 60% share in Kazakhstan’s AktobeMunaiGas for 4.3 billion dollars 
(Kembayev, 2018). China’s early interests in Kazakhstan were related to Kazakhstan’s energy 
resources, and investment into AktobeMunaiGas has been profitable for China and has solidified 
their investments in Kazakhstan’s economic future (“OIL; CNPC-AktobeMunaiGas Ups Oil 
Output 21% in 2017” ). By purchasing a majority share in the gas company, China immediately 
ensured that it would obtain a strong presence in Kazakhstan’s energy sector, which has led to 
the further joint development of both gas and crude oil pipelines. Crude oil and gas are 
Kazakhstan’s largest exports to China, and the ongoing construction of pipelines has helped to 
facilitate an easier transaction (Choi, 2019). Originally, China’s early commitment to the 
construction of an Eastern pipeline originating in the Kazakh oilfields resulted in Kazakhstan’s 
agreement to a solidified Sino-Kazakh partnership (Kembayev, 2018). In addition to the 
construction of a gas pipeline, the negotiations included the guarantee of legal rights to each 
other’s citizens and companies in their respective territories (“Indikativnyi plan razvitiia 
zakrytogo aktsionernogo obshchestva Natsional’naia kompaniia po transportirovke nefti 
‘KazTransOil’ na 2000–2005 gg” [Indicative Plan for the Development of the Closed Joint-Stock 
Company National Company for Oil Transportation KazTransOil for 2000–2005]). This 
cooperation creates a supportive environment for further negotiations and collaboration. 
Early on in the Sino-Kazakh economic collaboration, President Xi Jinping and Nazarbayev 
signed an agreement that provided China with an 8.4 percent stake in the Kashagan oil field and 
advanced the Central Asia-China pipeline further westward. This increased stake grew China’s 
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share in Kazakh oil production to a total of 22% (Perlez, 2013). The economic collaboration 
between the countries continues to expand beyond a lone bilateral partnership and now 
incorporates the larger Eurasian area. China’s Belt and Road Initiative has plans to expand 
infrastructure into every Central Asian republic, and Kazakhstan has served as a supporter and 
facilitator of this project in the early discussions of these plans (Akataeva, 2015).   
 A helpful aid in the development of the Sino-Kazakh bilateral partnership is the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO). The SCO, an organization that covers economic, political, and 
security issues for many Eurasian countries, has been a vital platform for the continuation of the 
Sino-Kazakh partnership, as it enables them to collaborate on a variety of broad issues in the 
region (Alimov, 2018). One of the most essential areas to the expanding Sino-Kazakh bilateral 
partnership is the energy sector. (Koch, 2013). In 2001, the SCO propelled the energy discussion 
by providing an official multi-country negotiation space, an important development, as the 
relationship between China and Kazakhstan regarding energy resources is China’s most direct 
path for influence in Kazakhstan (Serikkaliyeva, 2018). The institutional partnership provided by 
the SCO has created a platform for a multitude of different conversations on topics ranging from 
security to the more dominant topic of economic collaboration.  
While Kazakhstan’s multi-vector strategy enables the leveraging of benefits for 
Kazakhstan, China also greatly benefits from Kazakhstan’s cooperation in its various initiatives 
through increased access to resources and the provided opportunity to further develop its Belt 
and Road initiative (Clarke, 2015; Serikkaliyeva, 2018). The SCO has become a cornerstone of 
this relationship and an important space for communication that involves Russia as well. While 
the PRC and Russia are the two nuclear powers and UNSC permanent members in the SCO, the 
SCO facilitates a platform where Russia, China and Kazakhstan can interact and work together 
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(Choi, 2019). Kazakhstan arguably is the next most engaged member after China and Russia. 
The SCO provides an official space for Kazakhstan to serve as a partner to China, as well as a 
helpful advocate for other Central Asian countries that have resources to offer (Movkebaeva, 
2013).  
Choi (2019) argues in his study that there are problems that have been primarily ignored 
in the Sino-Kazakh partnership. His study is about the effect that Kazakhstan and the PRC’s 
economic distance and geographical remoteness has on their partnership. In a quantitative 
analysis of China and Kazakhstan’s economic transactions, the results indicate a greater overall 
benefit for China. However, Choi concedes that the relationship is rapidly changing and that the 
current infrastructure programs such as the creation of the dry port Khorgos, Kazakhstan’s recent 
membership into the WTO, and the advancement of the SCO have all altered the economic 
relationship in Kazakhstan’s favor (Choi, 2019).  
The Sino-Kazakh engagement in the SCO and in other agreements provide opportunities 
of social and political collaboration in addition to the original economic agreements, that further 
enhance this partnership. Kazakhstan provides resources for China’s development projects, while 
China has reciprocated with financial support, such as providing Kazakhstan with a loan 
equivalent to 10 billion dollars after the sharp decline in the economy after 2008. This loan 
helped Kazakhst manage the crisis resulting from the fall in oil prices (“China Lends Crisis-Hit 
Kazakhstan $10 Bln”). This collaboration and the importance of Kazakhstan to the success of 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative serve as counterweights to offset potential overdependence of 
Kazakhstan on China.  
While it could be argued that Kazakhstan has shifted some of its dependency on Russia to 
China, Kazakhstan maintains a diversity of partnerships with its muti-vectored foreign policy. 
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The Sion-Kazakh partnership provides Kazakhstan with greater economic and political options 
and is essential to maintaining its sovereignty. The Sino-Kazakh partnership is one of 
Kazakhstan’s vectors of foreign policy, and it in no way dominates other areas of Kazakhstan’s 
economic or political negotiations and partnerships. This is because Kazakhstan’s economic 
partnerships with the WTO, the United States, and the Central Asian republics collectively help 
to balance out the strength of the Sino-Kazakh relationship, just as the Sino-Kazakh relationship 
has helped to balance out Kazakh economic dependence on Russia (Konkakov and Kubayeva, 
2016). The most critical factor of this relationship is the provided economic and infrastructural 
support that China has provided Kazakhstan.  
 
III. The Renovation of Economic Infrastructure 
 
The Sino-Kazakh relationship has advanced from that of purely economic focus to a 
wider strategic partnership. Important aspects of the partnership have developed due to China’s 
new global development project, the Belt and Road initiative (BRI) (Serikkaliyeva, 2018). The 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), also known as the Modern Silk Road, is a Chinese-lead project 
with the goal of creating a comprehensive international network of railways, highways, and 
energy pipelines, in addition to relaxed requirements for border-crossings (Chatzky & McBride, 
2019). As previously mentioned, Kazakhstan was left with the remnants of Soviet-built 
infrastructure after independence that is still in dire need of reconstruction. Both the railway and 
automobile sectors suffer from inadequate maintenance and construction despite their critical 
role in Kazakhstan’s economy. There is an absence of adequate roads to places other than the 
main cities and the railway stations lack technical equipment. These weaknesses have greatly 
impeded Kazakhstan’s transportation network and productivity (Akataeva, 2015). These 
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infrastructural needs have already benefited from China’s BRI because of China’s plan to use 
Kazakhstan as a transportation hub between Europe and Central Asia.   
The most recent BRI developments have aided Kazakhstan’s internal development and 
overall economic capacity. These advancements grew from critical foundational collaboration 
agreements, beginning in 1992 with the creation of an “unobstructed passage through a railway 
crossing named ‘Friendship – Alashankou’, an original point for transportation cooperation 
between China and Kazakhstan” (Akataeva, 2015). After the declared infrastructural 
“friendship,” on November 23, 1999, in a joint Sino-Kazakh declaration on strengthening 
cooperation in the twenty-first century, Jiang Zemin and Nazarbayev proclaimed the intention of 
their countries to further facilitate economic cooperation by strengthening mutual trust and 
developing the New Silk Road. For that purpose, on December 23, 2002, China and Kazakhstan 
signed another agreement, the Treaty on Good Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation. 
This was an agreement to transform their mutual borders into “frontiers of eternal peace and 
friendship by: (a) intensifying their political and security cooperation; (b) enhancing economic 
ties; and (c) promoting social and cultural links” (Kembayev, 2018). 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative was first publicly announced in Astana in 2013, and 
China used Kazakhstan as a springboard for the global program (Higgins, 2018). Kazakhstan’s 
increased participation in the BRI has led to massive infrastructural and economic growth in the 
central regions of Kazakhstan. One especially important project has been the creation of the dry 
port in Khorgos. Chinese and Kazakh workers built the – now functioning - largest dry port in 
the world. It is planned to be a critical point of infrastructure for the Eurasian route of the BRI 
that will branch into both Europe and Central Asia. Khorgos is vital to the Eurasian route of the 
BRI because of its strategic positioning on the Sino-Kazakhstan border (Higgins, 2018). China 
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has additionally facilitated the growth of an entirely new city to house the workers at this port, 
thus spurring economic growth in a previously undeveloped area.  
As both an individual initiative and complement to this larger project, an agreement in 
2011 was signed by Kazakhstan and China, establishing that China would help develop 
infrastructure in Kazakhstan and, in turn, receive a portion of Kazakhstan’s natural resources 
(Koch, 2013). Additionally, visa-free transportation was established in order to open critical 
trade checkpoints such as Khorgos (Akateva, 2015). These projects signal the continued 
expansion of the Sino-Kazakh bilateral partnership.  
As the relationship grows, geopolitical alliances are revised in the region. Wasserman 
(2019) affirms that “recent shifts in geopolitics mean that China is now the actor with the ability 
and interest – due to its Belt and Road Initiative – to contain Russia in Central Asia.” China has 
extensive resources to initiate development, and Kazakhstan will continue to greatly benefit from 
Chinese-supported infrastructure construction and economic collaboration.  
On September 7, 2013, the two countries adopted a Program of Development of Trade 
and Economic Cooperation until 2020 (“Казакхстан и Китаи решат проблему 
трансграничныкх рек” [Kazakhstan i Kitai reshat problemu transgranichnykh rek; “Kazakhstan 
and China Solve the Problem of Transboundary Rivers”]). The program engages in the 
construction of a high-tech and high-speed transportation system that will connect European, 
Asia-Pacific, and South Asian economic regions. This project will serve to connect previously 
geographically isolated countries and because of Kazakhstan’s early involvement, Kazakhstan 
will benefit from future economic collaboration in the area and on the route (Shepard, 2016). 
These railways began to run from the East to the West in 2014 and are completely supported by 
Nazarbayev, as this infrastructural development furthers his goal of making Kazakhstan into a 
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“transcontinental land bridge” (“Казакхстан и Китаи решат проблему трансграничныкх рек” 
[Kazakhstan i Kitai reshat problemu transgranichnykh rek; “Kazakhstan and China Solve the 
Problem of Transboundary Rivers”]; Nurshayeva, 2013; Kembayev, 2018).  
Both the variety and volume of Sino-Kazakh collaborative infrastructure programs have 
enabled Kazakhstan to continue its economic growth. Ultimately, this infrastructure is and will 




Overall, the Sino-Kazakh relationship has expanded over time and has provided 
Kazakhstan with necessary infrastructure to facilitate the growth of its economy and rising 
international relevance. However, China is also a geo-politically essential partner in 
Kazakhstan’s development of autonomy and recognition beyond that of a post-Soviet country. 
Nazarbayev had emphasized a desire to overcome any overreliance on natural resources due to 
the historical tendency of resource-rich countries to depend on resource availability (Nazarbayev, 
2018a). However, despite the importance of natural resources to the two countries’ bilateral 
relationship, the Sino-Kazakh partnership continues to grow in various other areas such as 
infrastructural advancement and educational collaboration (Konkakov and Kubayeva ,2016; 
Alvarez, 2015). Additionally, the Sino-Kazakh partnership on the gas and oil pipelines critically 
reduces Russian influence within Kazakhstan’s natural resource sector (Alvarez, 2015).  
While this bilateral relationship has a central focus on economic and energy motivations, 
Kazakhstan has gained Chinese support for its international status, which protects its security and 
helps to legitimize its borders with further reputational security. The Belt and Road Initiative is 
occasionally viewed as a project of international domination, but the SCO has helped to develop 
a trusting relationship between the two countries that serves to collaboratively aid each country’s 
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individual goals and assuage any territory concerns (Standish, 2019). The multi-vectored 
approach to Chinese relations has served as a critical technique in managing these developments 
and will continue to aid Kazakhstan by providing leeway when balancing alliances between 
Russia and China with the ongoing separated projects and economic negotiations.  
Despite past events resulting in potential instability in the region, such as the war in 
Afghanistan and the Color Revolution, the Sino-Kazakh relationship has persisted, 
demonstrating the commitment and diplomatic success of both countries (Choi, 2019). 
Considering the Sino-Kazakh relationship going forward, some of the largest obstacles are those 
of domestic concern, such as public distrust of China’s actions. Kazakh citizens have historically 
viewed China as a geographical aggressor and one that has only self-interest, but public opinion 
has little influence over the future collaboration of China and Kazakhstan (Koch, 2013). I have 
demonstrated throughout this chapter that Kazakhstan plays an indispensable role in China’s 
energy sector and is a critical partner, necessary for the success of China’s modern Silk Road. 
The Sino-Kazakh relationship will also continue to aid Kazakhstan by providing leeway for its 
historical dependence on Russia and enable Kazakhstan to seek out resources and aid elsewhere 
through ongoing projects and further international engagement. Ultimately, this strategic 
partnership is advantageous to both China and Kazakhstan, and the mutual benefit reinforces the 
strength and possibility for future cooperative advancement of the Sino-Kazakh relationship.  
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Chapter Four: Kazakhstan’s Internationalization of Higher Education 
 
 “The monopoly of legitimate education is now more important, more central, than is the 
monopoly of legitimate violence” 




 Education is a critical area of development because of its potential to contribute to the 
participation of a country in global competition and the transformation of society. Kazakhstan 
has sought out a variety of different ways to grow as an autonomous country and has used the 
path of higher education as a primary way to modernize and promote its national agenda while 
attempting de-Sovietisation within its borders (Kissane, 2005). Kazakhstan additionally has an 
ambitious goal of entering the top thirty most developed countries in the world under its 
Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy. The country’s educational reforms aim to create a system that will 
increase its international respect while bringing it closer to its ambitious development goal 
(Nazarbayev, 2017).   
 Kazakhstan has adopted foreign strategies to improve its higher education institutions and 
to advance the intellectual level and skills of its people, through a process labeled 
“internationalization” (Li, 2018). Kazakhstan has both imported and exported resources that have 
helped it restructure its higher education system. After independence, Kazakhstan’s attempts to 
internationalize and transform the Soviet education system were motivated by the goal to meet 
the modern world’s standards of education (Ahn, 2018). The Soviet education system underwent 
reform during Soviet times, but its curriculum consistently focused on enforcing a collective 
mentality before postsecondary education. Higher education in the USSR placed an emphasis on 
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vocational training and students’ preparedness to contribute to the workforce instead of on 
individual achievement and scholarship, as the USSR prioritized the success of the state instead 
of the individual (Kuraev, 2016). The definition of modernity in education has transformed and 
progressively incorporates the engagement of significant domestic efforts and international 
collaboration. This increased engagement results from the growing importance of geopolitics in 
higher education and its role in intertwined country collaboration (Koch, 2014). An 
internationalized education is becoming increasingly common, and Kazakhstan has sought to 
achieve the standards held by prestigious, internationally-known universities (Serikkaliyeva, 
2019). 
The post-Soviet transition revealed Kazakhstan’s need for significant reform in its higher 
education system. The government has focused on internationalizing the higher education system 
to meet global standards and to cultivate a knowledge-based economy. A knowledge-based 
economy is characterized by the combination of designing appropriate knowledge infrastructures 
as well as developing human capital. Human capital is characterized by the skills and capabilities 
of an individual or group of people, and the subsequent benefit that those skills contribute to the 
economy and productivity of a country (Peter & Humes, 2003). Kazakhstan’s efforts are guided 
by international standards set by the Western world’s more prestigious research institutions. 
These standards are understood in the academic world as research quality, access to academic 
and research resources, and competitive instruction (Room, 2000). Consequently, Kazakhstan 
has completely rebuilt and reorganized its higher education system and shaped their efforts 
around international standards, structures, and partnerships to meet these standards. 
This chapter will lay out information to connect Kazakhstan’s achievements of higher 
education reform with the country’s increased development potential. It will analyze 
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Kazakhstan’s process of internationalization by mirroring Western higher education 
infrastructure (Koch, 2014). Additionally, this chapter will establish that Kazakhstan’s attempts 
to utilize international resources have helped Kazakhstan harness soft power to further assist 
development and establish dominance in the region and with its international partners. 
Kazakhstan higher education increasingly approaches a level that can compete with 
internationally prestigious institutions. Kazakhstan continues to work towards developing its 
higher institution infrastructure to compete with its prestigious academic partners.   
 
A. Internationalization and Globalization Terminology Specification 
 
Internationalization and globalization are both terms that are heavily used when discussing 
the changing global educational environment, however there is an important distinction between 
the two. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Culture Organization (UNESCO) 
defines globalization in education to concern “the flow of technology, economy, knowledge, 
people, values…across borders.” In this definition, globalization of education entails the broader 
aspects that can be gained and changed through international collaboration, such as adoption of 
one country’s education values in combination with those of the home country. 
Internationalization of education refers to the incorporation of more specific international 
aspects, such as curriculum, research, and institutional collaboration (Li, 2018). An example of 
globalization in education is the new widespread acceptance of multi-lingual instruction at a 
higher level. An example of internationalization of education is Kazakhstan’s incorporation of 
China’s curriculum into various courses at its institutions.   
In this chapter, I will mainly focus on the Kazakh government’s goal to internationalize its 
higher education, as internationalization is more directly in line with a government’s political 
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and economic motivations to compete in a globalized marketplace (Li, 2018). However, the 
terminology of globalization will come up in broader contexts.  
 
B. Metrics to Determine Successful Reform of Kazakh Higher Education 
 
Kazakhstan has set specific goals with the hopes of spurring an accelerated modernization of 
their economy. The Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy highlights the importance of modern technology 
to academic achievement. In one of the outlined goals, Nazarbayev encourages the incorporation 
of more technology into curriculums, as well as also emphasizing the fourth priority of the 
Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy - to improve the quality of Kazakhstan’s human capital. Nazarbayev 
demanded that the education system be reformed and focus on the development of critical 
thinking and research capabilities, specifically with a focus on improving higher education 
quality (Nazarbayev, 2017). Nazarbayev recently announced his goal to make Kazakhstan a tri-
lingual country, as in addition to the national importance of Russian and Kazakh, he recognizes 
the importance of the English language in new technological and industrial reform and 
advancement (Nazarbayev, 2018b). Kazakhstan’s goal to become a trilingual nation will be used 
as a metric of Kazakhstan’s efforts to incorporate English into their higher education system.  
Intertwined with Kazakhstan’s goals for its education system is Nazarbayev’s goal of 
international collaboration. A hopeful outcome of this goal is the development of joint academic 
and research projects with other competitive foreign universities (Nazarbayev, 2018a). In the 
same speech that he announced these aspirations, Nazarbayev emphasized that Kazakh students 
should be dedicated Kazakh citizens in culture, language, and history, as well as prepared for the 
modern world with a “progressive and global worldview” (Nazarbayev, 2018a). The emphasis on 
domestic education by the Kazakh government seeks to motivate students to achieve a 
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competitive degree within Kazakhstan; the ability to do so subsequently enhances feelings of 
Kazakh pride. The reforms for Kazakh higher education also seek to incorporate critical 
international expertise and experience into their education to teach students a global worldview. 
This is all aimed to foster better preparation of students to contribute to the globalizing economy. 
I use Nazarbayev’s declarations as metrics to measure Kazakhstan’s progress on these goals 
through analysis of domestic education, educational partnerships, and international academic 
cooperation. 
 
II. Domestic Higher Education Reform  
 
Kazakhstan has undergone numerous stages of educational reform since independence. More 
recent reforms have significantly altered higher education infrastructure and sought to revamp 
Kazakhstan’s underdeveloped research capabilities. Educational attainment is widely cited as the 
most direct area that increases human capital and thus, economic development. Florida et al. 
have found that the ability to increase a country’s human capital leads to an increase of a 
region’s income and wealth. By raising average Kazakh income, Kazakhstan will be able to 
increase their GDP per capita, leading to greater overall economic capacity throughout the 
country (Florida et al., 2008). While the various reforms are executed by individual policies and 
intentions, they have an additional underlying goal of integrating Kazakhstan’s higher education 
into the “world educational space,” indicating the increased transferability of a Kazakh 
University education (Jilkishieva et al., 2019). The Kazakh government also demonstrates a 
simultaneous recognition of the importance of knowledge as a commodity in the international 
political space (Li, 2018). Thus, a more competitive education and the ability to collaborate on 
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an international scale with research institutions and important industry advancement is critical to 
Kazakhstan’s advancement beyond that of just its education system (Jumakulov, 2019).  
 
A. State Education Development Programs  
 
In 1991, the structure and foundation of Kazakh higher education institutions differed from 
that of the dominant higher education institutions, such as those in the United States (Kuraev, 
2016). Kazakhstan has since implemented a reconstruction of its academic infrastructure with a 
variety of reform programs that increasingly distinguish its academic policies and structure from 
the older education systems of neighboring countries. For the purposes of this thesis, this section 
will discuss two consecutive programs responsible for the most extreme changes to Kazakhstan’s 
system of higher education.  
Kazakhstan’s first program to enable international academic collaboration was titled the State 
Education Development Program for 2005-2010. This program introduced the more dominant 
three-cycle structure to higher education to align with the West’s structure of Bachelor, Graduate 
and PhD degree options. This three-cycle design has become the international standard, and the 
enacted changes in Kazakhstan have enabled Kazakh students to participate internationally in 
higher education (Massyrova, 2015). An especially notable reform made possible by this 
program was the adoption of the international “Bologna Process” (Pinov & Pak, 2006). The 
“Bologna Process” is embodied by the European Higher Education Area, EHEA, a collaborative 
international group with the same commitment to improving higher education (“European 
Higher Education Area and Bologna Process”). This international process has helped Kazakhstan 
bolster its foreign academic positioning through Kazakh student’s participation in universities in 
collaborating countries (Massyrova, 2015). The Bologna Process marked the start of 
 
    52 
Kazakhstan’s individual contributions to modern higher education and research, as it sent its 
citizens abroad. It concurrently aided Nazarbayev’s ultimate nation-building agenda through the 
facilitation of competitive education for Kazakh citizens at a time when Kazakhstan could not 
provide a competitive higher education domestically. It has been an essential program in 
advancing Kazakh education internationalization.  
Another program that has advanced the capabilities of Kazakh higher education is the State 
Program of Industrial and Innovative Development-2 (SPIID-2) that was launched in 2015. 
While this program focused on a variety of new policies aimed at increasing the efficiency of 
Kazakh industry and development, the education component outlined four strategic additions to 
Kazakhstan’s education system, all critical to Nazarbayev’s ultimate education goal (Jumakulov, 
2019). The SPIID-2 was created to “guarantee stable and well-balanced economic growth by 
means of diversification and improvement of its competitive ability” (SPFIID, 2010). The 
SPIID-2 has focused significantly more on the role that education played in economic 
development and the facilitation of human capital. It has embraced the importance of a 
knowledge-based economy, as competitive academic capabilities have become increasingly 
critical through the wider internationalization of education and the new standard of global 
accessibility (Jumakulov, 2019; Koch, 2014). SPIID-2 responded to the rising academic 
standards through the advertisement of this program and its emphasis on 
  “developing collaborative partnerships with leading international universities; creating 
new postgraduate programs in collaboration with their international university and industry 
partners; enhancing research and professional capacity of faculty and staff; modernizing facilities 
and academic infrastructure; and facilitating the employment of SPIID-2 program graduates” 
(Jumakulov, 2019).  
 
 These conditions officially recognize the connection between higher education and the 
success of industry in Kazakhstan, and SPIID-2 has aimed to provide the necessary resources 
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domestically for Kazakh students and future industry workers. Furthermore, these advances have 
increasingly allowed Kazakhstan to compete on an international scale in the academic world, 
critically at the time of the growing importance of international research collaboration. 
 Particularly, the Kazakh government wanted to increase the success and recognition of 
Kazakhstan’s research institutions. It has sought to achieve this through its collaboration with 
other international research institutions, and its development of new domestic research-based 
institutions (Jumakova, 2019). These actions ultimately boost Kazakhstan’s domestic industry 
development and future GDP by advancing the opportunity for higher education and addressing 
ingrained academic obstacles. 
 
B. The Creation of Nazarbayev University 
 
 One of the most ambitious projects to improve Kazakhstan’s internal research capabilities 
and create a platform of collaboration for international institutions is the construction of a brand-
new research-based university, Nazarbayev University (NU). NU is a project initiated by 
President Nazarbayev with the aim to create a university that directly aligns with the goals of 
SPIID-2 (“Nazarbayev University at a Glance”). These goals include the advancement of 
research capabilities, international institutional collaboration, and the improvement of quality in 
domestic institutions to increase achievements of competitive Kazakh students. 
 Furthermore, the creation of NU was accompanied by the decrease in number of 
recipients of the popular government scholarship, the Bolashak Study Abroad Scholarship. This 
scholarship provides government funds to high achieving students to go abroad for a graduate 
education and then bring their expertise home to work for a required 5 years in a Kazakh 
industry (Koch, 2014). Surveys of the student population in Kazakhstan reveal that many who 
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received the Bolashak Scholarship have failed to return to Kazakhstan (Koch, 2014). The 
Kazakh government established that NU would be a better opportunity for Kazakh students to 
gain expertise while remaining inside Kazakhstan. By providing a competitive education 
domestically, Kazakhstan can more directly guarantee that its brightest students remain in 
Kazakhstan and contribute as human capital to advance Kazakh industry. The decreased amount 
of Bolashak scholarships may decrease the number of Kazakh students that study in participating 
Western countries, but the advancement of domestic academic accomplishments will help to 
motivate Kazakh students to pursue domestic higher education and ultimately help Kazakhstan 
become more competitive globally. 
 Nazarbayev developed this university as a way to diminish the differences between 
foreign higher education and higher education in Kazakhstan. The University was also designed 
to be a subject of pride for the Kazakh citizens, as one of NU’s core principles is a “love of 
country” (Koch, 2014; “Nazarbayev University at a Glance”). One of Nazarbayev’s overarching 
goals in Kazakhstan has been the promotion of Kazakh nationalism, and this new university in 
the country’s capital elicits national pride because of its impressive architecture and accessibility 
to resources. Another accomplishment of increased nationalism is a greater pride in Kazakhstan 
individually, helping de-Sovietisation domestically. Nazarbayev University has a number of 
strategic partnerships with international institutions such as Duke University, University of 
Wisconsin, and University of Cambridge, which are all heavily advertised on the NU’s home 
website (“Nazarbayev University at a Glance”). NU, as a modern research institution, is 
important to Kazakhstan’s domestic progress and international recognition, as it completely 
embraces the concept of academic internationalization (Li, 2018). 
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 In addition to its new buildings and research laboratories, Nazarbayev University invests 
a large amount of funds to attract Western scholars as faculty. Western scholars are brought in to 
teach the future generation of Kazakh industry workers, academics, and politicians. These 
professors are given high salaries, relaxed schedules, and do not have to learn the Kazakh 
language, as all classes at NU are taught in English (Koch, 2014). The language of instruction is 
yet another revolutionary aspect of this new University, as it is a factor aiming to advance the 
goal of national trilingual ability (Nazarbayev, 2017).   
 Overall, Kazakhstan has undergone enormous reforms to the structure and design of NU 
and its other higher education institutions. These reforms and new constructions seek to expand 
industry potential and streamline education by investing in the growth of human capital. Such 
reforms incorporate international features of education and research. Through collaboration and 
strategic partnership, Kazakhstan continues to apply these changes in domestic universities to try 
and decrease the risk of losing accomplished students to foreign institutions and lifestyles.  
  
III. International Academic Partnerships 
 
While Kazakhstan’s recent domestic reforms are more focused inwards on Kazakhstan’s 
institutions’ quality and their ability to match international standards, the need for international 
educational collaboration is also an area that Nazarbayev has sought to expand. International 
partnerships in higher education are important because of the connection between international 
education and country collaboration. By rapidly expanding the economic, political, and 
diplomatic capabilities of Kazakhstan, internationalization of higher education advances the 
goals of the Kazakh government. Attending a higher institution abroad allows students to 
diversify their knowledge and distinguish their studies through the achievement of an 
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international perspective with cross-cultural experiences and cooperation. The emphasis of the 
Kazakh government on gaining these skills has led to a large number of Kazakh students 
studying abroad and pursuing a graduate degree outside of the country, as they are able to attend 
prestigious schools with the help of government and institutional funding. Various factors of the 
Kazakh higher education system actually make it more attractive to complete degrees abroad.  
The domestic universities can only support fifty percent of industry demands, as there is an 
insufficient number of academies to educate teachers and professors to the standards required by 
SPIID-2. This is causing Nazarbayev University to outsource from other countries for a majority 
of its faculty (Massyrova, 2015; Koch, 2014). Furthermore, higher education in Kazakhstan is 
only free for around ten percent of students by way of merit-scholarships. The other students are 
required to pay 18,000 dollars for tuition, almost double that of Kazakhstan’s GDP per capita in 
2018, thus rendering many potential university students incapable of studying at Kazakh 
Universities (Koch, 2014; “GDP per Capita [Current US$]- Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan”). The government provides a variety of opportunities for 
Kazakh students to receive funding to pursue an academic degree internationally.  
 
A. Kazakh Students Abroad 
 
In 2015, 66,623 Kazakh students were enrolled in higher education abroad. Nazarbayev has 
placed an emphasis on education abroad since independence, and despite the advancement of 
domestic higher institutions, the already large number of Kazakh students in international 
institutions continues to grow.  
The majority of international education opportunities are provided by the Kazakh Ministry of 
Education and Science (MoES), through facilitation of mutual exchanges with a variety of 
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countries to provide the opportunity for international students to come and study in Kazakhstan 
(Karimova, 2006). Scholarships from the Kazakh government, international educational 
institutions, and foreign governments are widely available and promote the international 
education of Kazakh students as well (Karimova, 2006). Despite these opportunities that may 
provide an opportunity for a more competitive education, Kazakhstan focuses their efforts on 
promoting domestic higher education for Kazakh students in an effort to keep their most talented 
students within the country (Koch, 2014).  
The most significant scholarship enabling Kazakh students to receive an education abroad is 
the Bolashak Scholarship. It was developed in 1993 and has sent around 3,000 students abroad 
every year (“История Программы ‘Болашак’” [ Istorija Programmy ‘Bolashak’; “History of the 
‘Bolashak’ Program”]). The number of students wanting to participate continues to grow as well 
as the number of cooperating institutions. This scholarship is seen as a critical aspect of higher 
education development, as the participating students are able to improve their quality of 
education and contribute to the Kazakh workforce more effectively. Thus, it is in line with the 
overarching goal of the Kazakh government to develop a knowledge based economy that can 
adapt to international standards; students ideally return with a refined education and international 
experience. This has the potential to change with the decreasing number of open Bolashak 
scholarships for Kazakhs students.  
There are a wide variety of countries that collaborate with the MoES, but the highest 
percentage of Kazakh students study in Russia or other Central Asian countries to further their 
education. Recently, however, there has been a large movement of students going to China, 
Europe and the United States to receive a degree of higher education. This more recent interest in 
going to the East and West of Kazakhstan instead reflects the widening of Kazakhstan’s overall 
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foreign collaboration, which is also reflected in its economic and international leadership. The 
rapidly increasing international collaboration of Kazakhstan, discussed in the previous chapters, 
has progressively created greater opportunities for international education. With the increase of 
globalization and the expansion of Kazakhstan’s reach, non-Russian education options are 
growing in popularity (“Outbound Mobility from Kazakhstan up 140% over Past Decade”).  
 
B. China’s Role in Kazakhstan’s Educational Reform 
 
China provides an example of where Kazakhstan has collaborated most heavily with 
academic partners outside of Russia. China has one of the most comprehensive higher education 
systems in the world and constantly seeks to gain international recognition for its higher 
educational achievements, prestige, and research innovation (Serikkaliyeva, 2019). China’s 
ambitious goals are well known throughout Kazakhstan due to the growing collaboration of the 
two countries, and Kazakh students have been increasingly attracted to the opportunity of 
receiving a higher education from one of the prestigious Chinese academic institutions. 
Furthermore, the cost of a higher education in China is inexpensive and manageable for many 
Kazakh students (Sadovskaya, 2013). In 2015, more than 13,000 Kazakh students left to study in 
China, compared to the 20 Kazakhstani students that studied in China in the 2003/2004 school 
year. This expansion reflects a large movement of the students to China who - in the past - would 
typically have stayed in Central Asia or Russia (“Outbound Mobility from Kazakhstan up 140% 
over Past Decade”). In addition to the lower cost of an education in China, various grants are 
available through the SCO, enabling even more Kazakh students to receive a competitive 
education despite potential financial problems. Research even states that China has sought to 
specifically attract Kazakh students to their institutions (Serikkaliyeva, 2019).  
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An important aspect of this academic diaspora is the influence that living in China has on the 
future generations of Kazakhstan. While there is survey research that suggests Kazakh citizens 
are suspicious of the more recent Sino-Kazakh diplomatic collaboration, this academic change 
has the potential to influence the public opinion of Kazakh citizens through soft diplomacy 
power (Koch, 2013). Soft power is the idea that a country’s government can accomplish positive 
international diplomacy through collaboration and persuasion with/of a country instead of 
through force (Nye, 2019). Due to the current hesitations regarding the Sino-Kazakh economic 
relationship from the Kazakh citizenry, China stands to benefit from the increase of Kazakh 
students and their subsequent positive experiences in China; ideally achieved by gaining more 
Kazakh students in its educational system (Serikkaliyeva, 2019).  
Kazakhstan’s soft-power collaboration with China provides more depth to an already 
developed economic partnership. These cross-border cooperation’s are especially important for 
creating a mutual trust between the citizens of both countries. Despite the top-down partnership 
of the Sino-Kazakh leadership, the new relationship still has a long way to go before it can rival 
that of the deep-rooted Russo-Kazakh historical relationship in culture, language and experience. 
A more in-depth partnership between China and Kazakhstan will grant Kazakhstan greater 
sovereignty through expanded cultural diversity within Kazakhstan and the consequential de-
Sovietisation that may occur. 
 
C. Western Academic Collaboration with Kazakhstan 
 
Soft power is a large factor of Kazakh students studying abroad and international students 
coming into Kazakhstan. International collaboration is seen as a critical pathway for developing 
positive relations between two countries through the socialization of the younger generations 
(Fulbright Student Program - About). Kazakhstan also collaborates with the West in various 
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academic settings. A method by which this international collaboration with the West is pursued 
is through cross-cultural programs such as the Fulbright, Princeton in Asia, and a variety of other 
similar programs that fund students and academics to travel to Kazakhstan and other 
participating countries for research and cultural immersion programs.  
Another critical demonstration of rising Kazakh relevance in the international community 
and international soft power efforts can be seen by the growth of the United States Fulbright 
program in Kazakhstan. The United States Fulbright Program is of special importance in creating 
positive cooperation between US and Kazakh students through the presence of US students in 
various cities in Kazakhstan. Fulbright scholars conduct research projects and teach English 
while working in American Corners: regional resource centers created by the United States 
Department of State to educate locals about American culture (“American Corners”). U.S 
Fulbright scholars conduct projects and integrate themselves with the community, serving to 
advance the English fluency goal of Kazakhstan (Nazarbayev, 2017). Kazakhstan has 
collaborated with the United States to advance the available Fulbright positions in Kazakhstan 
over the past fifteen years to increase the amount of English teaching faculty and promote 
positive soft diplomacy between the two counties (“Kazakhstan”). With the increased number of 
positions, there is a greater possibility for positive relationships to develop between Kazakh and 
American citizens. The global rate of student mobility has exponentially grown in the 21st 
century and consequently has advanced similar soft power motivated programs all over the world 
(Li, 2018).  
Given the distinct difference in life and culture between Kazakhstan and the United States, 
the Fulbright is an especially good program for both countries, as a mutual understanding and 
friendship can be created through the high volume of inevitable interactions a Fulbright 
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participant has. The Fulbright is only one of the US-Kazakh academic programs, but it, along 
with many other similar programs such as Princeton in Asia, provide a positive opportunity for 
Kazakhstan to continue de-Sovietisation. These exchange programs help with de-Sovietisation 
through increased engagement of Kazakh citizens with international citizens, specifically from 
the West, as greater international engagement offsets the traditional heavy influence of Russians 
in Kazakhstan. Through participation in programs such as these, Kazakhstan is able to take part 
in and contribute to the global sharing of cultural identity and collaboration, ultimately aiding 




Kazakhstan’s reform of its higher educational infrastructure and efforts to participate in the 
global internationalization of education have enabled it to begin to increase its human capital 
domestically. Through raising the intellectual standards of its citizens, Kazakhstan will be able to 
strengthen its workforce, industrial productivity, and innovation. This progress can already be 
seen in the example of Nazarbayev University, where the recognition of improving university 
quality is identified and pursued. These efforts have enabled Kazakhstan to continue its outward-
focused foreign policy and subsequently achieve more sovereignty from remaining Soviet 
influence. Kazakhstan has ultimately used higher education as one of the primary areas for de-
Sovietisation as the country employs new international measures domestically and new methods 
of international academic collaboration (Kissane, 2005). Along with Kazakhstan’s national 
trilingual goal, Kazakh students are gaining the ability to participate and engage competitively on 
an international scale. Thus, education reform greatly contributing to Kazakhstan’s successes in 
developing a more educated civilian population, and Kazakhstan will continue to employ these 
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strategies through the continuous growth of its academic resources, research capabilities and 
educational opportunities.  
While Kazakhstan still motivates many students to pursue a competitive education 
internationally, the significant efforts of the Kazakh government to revamp the higher education 
institutions reflect the likelihood that in the future, Kazakhstan has a genuine chance to reach its 
ultimate goals. Nazarbayev University is an integral step towards this achievement and will serve 
as an example for the ongoing university reforms.  
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Chapter Five: The Emergence of an Independent Kazakhstan 
 
“Sovereignty is not given, it is taken.” 
- Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 
 
 
I. Introduction  
 
This chapter discusses the findings of this thesis and applies them to Kazakhstan’s future 
trajectory and potential to accomplish goals outlined in the Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy. 
Additionally, I examine the United States’ policy and interests in the area and make 
recommendations about how to apply the findings in this thesis to future US involvement. Lastly, 
I discuss possible topics for future research on the subject of Kazakhstan’s modernization and 
sovereignty.  
 
II. Summary of Findings 
 
Each of the main chapters of this thesis covered a critical area of Kazakhstan’s 
development that supports Kazakhstan’s increasing autonomy and sovereignty from Russia. 
Chapter Two discussed Kazakhstan’s contributions to the Nunn-Lugar nonproliferation program 
and its memberships in the UNSC, WTO, and CICA. The Nunn-Lugar nonproliferation program 
provided Kazakhstan with its first opportunity to affect international security and its advocacy 
for the project increased Kazakhstan’s international presence. Nazarbayev’s leadership and 
initiative helped to show investors that Kazakhstan was a dependable country to invest in. 
Kazakhstan’s recent membership in the UNSC and WTO have further helped advance its 
reputational security and international engagement, which have both provided Kazakhstan 
freedom from Russia’s previously dominating influence in the country.  
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Chapter Three used evidence of the Sino-Kazakh partnership to demonstrate 
Kazakhstan’s advancement of its economic and infrastructural capacity. The Sino-Kazakh 
partnership has provided Kazakhstan with critical infrastructure that it was unable to develop by 
itself. The two countries’ collaboration continues to expand and is mutually beneficial. 
Kazakhstan plays a critical role in the advancement of China’s Belt and Road initiative and the 
advancing Sino-Kazakh partnership has enabled Kazakhstan to distance itself from Russia and 
lessen its dependency on Russian economic aid.  
Chapter Four outlined Nazarbayev’s reform and increased internationalization of 
Kazakhstan’s higher education system. Kazakhstan’s reforms in this area continue to help the 
country advance its international reputation and increase the number of opportunities available 
for Kazakh student’s to engage in international affairs. The West has also expanded its efforts 
through academic scholarships that seek to establish soft diplomacy with Kazakh citizens and 
government. The advancement of the Kazakh higher education system continues to provide 
Kazakhstan with resources and opportunities to advance its positioning in the international 
community through academic competition and collaboration. Kazakhstan’s international 
academic cooperation has subsequently aided its relationships with participating countries such 
as those in the EU and China. This diversification of its engagements contributes to increased de-
Sovietisation in Kazakhstan, and further advances its sovereignty as an independent country.  
These chapters have discussed the extensive development reforms implemented by 
Kazakhstan, and through a variety of metrics, each chapter has determined Kazakhstan’s success 
in establishing further sovereignty and geopolitical distance from Russia. The evidence provided 
amounts to support my argument that Kazakhstan has achieved sovereignty from Russia through 
strategic foreign policy and engagement.  
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III. Kazakhstan’s Geopolitical Trajectory and Future Research 
 
Throughout his leadership, President Nur Sultan Nazarbayev initiated significant and 
ambitious reform within Kazakhstan. His progressive initiatives have increased Kazakhstan’s 
international positioning, economic development, and have internationalized higher education. 
The reforms in these three sectors have fundamentally modernized and advanced Kazakhstan. 
In February of 2019, Kazakhstan’s government underwent a transfer of power where Nazarbayev 
stepped down and endorsed Kassym-Jomart Tokayev as Kazakhstan’s new president. This 
transfer of power is unprecedented in Kazakhstan. However, Nazarbayev remains active in the 
background, keeping his legal title of “leader of the nation” and was granted with the newly 
created title of Honorary Senator (pochetnovo senatora) (“Назарбаев Получил Второй Титул 
За Два Дня”; [“Nazarbayev Received a Second Title in Two Days”]; Higgins, 2019).  
Tokayev plans to continue in Nazarbayev’s footsteps and has stated that he will not 
significantly change any policies or do anything to affect Kazakhstan’s relationship with Russia 
or China. However, there is potential for change in the greater Central Asian region 
(McGlinchey, 2019). Nazarbayev was a president who sought to maintain influence in as many 
areas as possible through establishment of collaborative organizations and positive relations, 
which he did with ease as Central Asia’s Statesman. The role of Central Asia’s Stateman is a 
highly competitive position. While Nazarbayev was undeniably an exceptionally skilled leader, 
qualified for the Statesman position, President Tokayev may not have the skills required to 
establish himself and his country as a leader among the other Central Asian republics, especially 
given the increasing international engagement of Mirziyoyev, Uzbekistan’s new president 
("Engel Statement on Kazakhstan Presidential Transition"). This thesis has established 
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Nazarbayev’s critical role as a leader and advocator for Central Asia and it is uncertain if 
Kazakhstan’s leadership in the region will continue or change.  
Tokayev will continue to fulfill the goals of Nazarbayev’s Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy with 
the support of the Kazakh Government. The ambitious goal to be among the 30 most developed 
countries by 2050 is becoming increasingly tangible as a result of the successes outlined in this 
thesis and the increasing availability of support from Kazakhstan’s international partners.  
However, the international ranking system for country development, the Human 
Development Index (HDI), had Kazakhstan positioned as number 58 in 2016 (“Human 
Development Reports”). The massive advancement that Kazakhstan desires will require 
continued improvement in international relations and the economic sectors of the country, and 
also in areas such as civil service and democratic institutions (Janenova & Knox, 2017). While 
the ability to improve the Kazakh education system will help advance innovation and human 
capital, the actual governance structures within Kazakhstan require significant reform. Given 
Kazakhstan’s authoritarian history, this will be a distinct challenge due to the tradition of 
centralized power (Janenova & Knox, 2017).  
Kazakhstan has clear-cut goals and strategies in place to achieve these goals. Therefore, it 
is only a matter of effective execution that will determine if Kazakhstan can surpass 28 
countries’ development rankings and achieve the ambitious goal of becoming one of the top 
thirty most developed countries in the world by 2050.  
 
IV. The United States’ Interests in Kazakhstan and Central Asia 
 
The United States’ interest in Central Asia has fluctuated based on global events. In the 
1990s, US involvement in the area was sparse but aimed towards "fostering political stability, 
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maintaining access to regional markets, ensuring freedom of navigation, and preventing the rise 
of any hostile hegemony" (Binnendijk, 1996). This drastically changed after September 11, 
2001. The terrorist attacks on the United States spurred a vast expansion of US involvement in 
the Middle East (McCarthy, 2007). The neighboring Central Asian republics served as vital 
partners to the US in the Americans’ combat operation in Afghanistan. The Central Asian 
republics also allowed US troops access to their territory and air bases to further the military 
efforts in Afghanistan. This relationship was supported by the mutual interest of both parties to 
curb extremism in the area (Pihlblad & Tian, 2012).  
However, in the mid-2000s, US relations in the area deteriorated as the Republics either 
disconnected from foreign influence or found more agreeable partnerships with countries such as 
China and Russia. The United States became a less desirable partner due to the pressure put on 
Kazakhstan by the United States to democratize and improve various human rights abuses. China 
and Russia however did not require such changes for their partnerships (McCarthy, 2007). The 
United States’ continued interest in Kazakhstan has more recently been recognized in their 
efforts to prevent a monopoly of interest by China and Russia. China and Russia’s dominance in 
Kazakhstan has become a more pressing concern because of the increased economic 
collaboration through the SCO and the Belt and Road Initiative (Pihlblad & Tian, 2012). 
Furthermore, there was a deteriorating favorability toward the United States, evident from public 
polls taken in Central Asia in the early 2000s (McCarthy, 2007). The United States continuously 
tried to curb these sentiments through traditional methods such as economic assistance and 
occasional public support for their progress. However, the United States was still unable to incite 
significant improvement of the perception of the United States in Central Asia (Pihlblad & Tian, 
2012).  
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 The recent declaration of Nazarbayev to make Kazakhstan a trilingual nation provides a 
potential opportunity for the United States to increase its influence in the nation (Nazarbayev, 
2017). The expanded incorporation of English into Kazakh society and education may increase 
Kazakhstan’s interest in collaboration with English-dominant countries and provide the US with 
an opportunity to help and provide English educational resources. However, an updated strategy 
in the region is required. In a meeting on the current developments in Central Asia in the House 
Committee on International Relations, expert Fredrick Starr discussed the critical points of the 
US-Central Asian relationship and made policy recommendations for an updated strategy in the 
region. Starr’s recommendations emphasize the importance of recognizing the zone as 
legitimately and critically important in the world. Additionally, Starr expresses the importance of 
collaboration in the region both with the governments of each country and the other majorly 
involved countries in the area, such as Russia and China. This is followed up with a policy 
suggestion to work collaboratively with each country rather than executing any policy with force. 
Starr essentially recommends that the United States proceed with caution and avoid any action 
that might suggest the United States’ aggression or control in the area. This is especially 
important due to the delicate nature of the region and its powerful nuclear neighbors that are 
trusted partners of Kazakhstan.    
A critical acknowledgement that Starr makes is the primary focus of the Central Asian 
region on maintaining its sovereignty (Starr, 2018). This has previously been established in my 
thesis and alongside his previously mentioned recommendations, I provide a few additional 
considerations for the United States’ diplomatic efforts in Central Asia, specifically in 
Kazakhstan. 
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 On the basis of security and human rights, Starr acknowledges that security in the region 
is most often prioritized over issues of human rights (Starr, 2018). However, there is great 
potential to negotiate in these areas and utilize Kazakhstan’s goals as direction in those 
negotiations. For example, the United States might offer aid or resources for Kazakhstan’s higher 
education institutions in exchange for potential recognition of human rights by the government. 
Additionally, there should be attention paid to the research that has established Tokayev as a 
softer-handed leader than Nazarbayev in human rights (Higgins, 2019). If Tokayev proves to be 
a more lenient and agreeable president, there will be greater potential in the future to work with 
him on projects of human rights or democratization in the country. The United States, if able to 
continue their increasingly positive relationship with the country, could use its positioning as a 
starting point to establish increased trust and advance US-Kazakh collaboration.  
 Additionally, the US-Kazakh relationship has the potential for expansion if the United 
States were to both recognize the legitimate sovereignty of Kazakhstan and engage it in more 
collaborative projects. Increased engagement could include the continued inclusion of 
Kazakhstan in current non-proliferation efforts, heightened recognition of its leadership and 
success in the development of its economy, or further support and facilitation of US-Kazakh 
higher education collaboration. Given the importance of these issues to Kazakhstan’s wider 
development goals, I believe the United States’ support and recognition of its accomplishments 
would greatly reinforce US-Kazakh collaboration and partnership.  
 An improved relationship and expanded partnership with Kazakhstan has the potential to 
greatly benefit the United States. Kazakhstan is located in a strategic location between the United 
States’ two major competitors, China and Russia, and a close relationship with Kazakhstan 
would improve the ability of the United States to keep up with pressing issues in the area. 
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Furthermore, a broader partnership with Kazakhstan would ease the ability of the United States’ 
efforts in the rest of Central Asia as a result of the leadership and respect that Kazakhstan holds 
in the region.  
 An important factor to consider in the United States’ continued efforts in the area is the 
looming presence and involvement of China and Russia in Kazakhstan. Both have significant 
investments in the area, and Blank affirms that "Russia and China view any U.S. presence in 
Central Asia as a type of threat to their virtual interests" (Blank, 2007). While I suggest the 
increased involvement of the United States in Kazakhstan’s various projects of development, it is 
essential that the strategy be implemented with caution as to not aggressively encroach on 
Russian or Chinese interests.  
 
V. Areas for Future Research 
 
This thesis studies the effects of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy and engagement on 
Kazakhstan’s sovereignty from Russia. It does not address in detail the domestic sectors that 
have a potential to further affect and establish Kazakh independence. Further research into the 
effects of Kazakhstan’s domestic sectors could provide new information about how domestic 
trends affect a country’s international cooperation and sovereignty. Additionally, while the thesis 
addresses the important role that China plays in Kazakhstan’s ability to diversify its partnerships, 
there is great potential to go further in depth in the effects of the Sino-Kazakh relationship on 
domestic politics and civil society in Kazakhstan. The increased presence of China in Kazakh 
affairs is likely to affect the lives of Kazakh citizens due to China’s extensive aid in the 
development of Kazakhstan’s transportation and economic infrastructure. This would be a novel 
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direction of research, as it will continue to change as Kazakhstan’s participation in the 




Kazakhstan has emerged from the wreckage of 1991 almost thirty years later as an 
established country with international influence. The profound reform that Kazakhstan has 
undergone is largely due to the leadership and strategy of President Nur-Sultan Nazarbayev. As 
of 2019, his official international legacy has come to an end, but there is considerable evidence 
of his achievements. Kazakhstan’s previous membership in the Soviet Union has shaped 
Kazakhstan’s institutions and international reputation. However, this thesis establishes that, as a 
result of Kazakhstan’s reforms and Nazarbayev’s strategic foreign policy, the country is now 
recognized in diplomatic leadership, prepared with rapidly improving economic infrastructure, 
and is ready to continue revolutionizing its higher education system. These accomplishments in 
such critical areas of development have helped Kazakhstan to increase its sovereignty from 
Russia’s dominating sphere of influence, thus gaining a respected position as an independent 
contributor to the international community.    
  
 
    72 
Bibliography 
 
Abzhaparova, Aida. “Denuclearization Practices of Kazakhstan: Performing Sovereign Identity, 
Preserving National Security.” Review of International Studies, vol. 37, no. 4, 2011, pp. 
1537–1553. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/23025565. Accessed 6 Feb. 2020. 
 
Ahn, Elise S., et al. “Looking at Kazakhstan’s Higher Education Landscape: From Transition to 
Transformation Between 1920 and 2015.” 25 Years of Transformations of Higher 
Education Systems in Post-Soviet Countries: Reform and Continuity, edited by Jeroen 
Huisman et al., Springer International Publishing, 2018, pp. 199–227, doi:10.1007/978-3-
319-52980-6_8. 
Aitken, Jonathan. Nazarbayev and the Making of Kazakhstan. Continuum, 2010. 
Akataeva, Alia. “KAZAKHSTAN-CHINA TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS.” 
Himalayan and Central Asian Studies, vol. 10, no. 4, Himalayan research and Cultural 
Foundation, 1/10/2006, p. 45. 
 
Ali, Sabna, et al. “Happiness and the Resource Curse.” Journal of Happiness Studies, Feb. 2019. 
Springer Link, doi:10.1007/s10902-019-00080-3. 
 
Ambrosio, Thomas, & William A. Lange. “Mapping Kazakhstan’s geopolitical code: an analysis 
of Nazarbayev’s presidential addresses, 1997–2014.” Eurasian Geography and 
Economics, vol 55 no 5, 2014, pp. 537-559. DOI: 10.1080/15387216.2015.1024272 
 
Amirbekova, Ainur, Diana Madiyarova, Inna Andronova. "What are the Pros and Cons for 
Kazakhstan of Joining the WTO from an Export Potential Point of View?" Journal of 




Alimov, Rashid. “The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: Its Role and Place in the 
Development of Eurasia.” Journal of Eurasian Studies, vol. 9, no. 2, July 2018, pp. 114–
24. ScienceDirect, doi:10.1016/j.euras.2018.08.001. 
 
Álvarez, César B. M. "CHINA-KAZAKHSTAN ENERGY RELATIONS BETWEEN 1997 
AND 2012." Journal of International Affairs, vol. 69, no. 1, 2015, pp. 57-VI. ProQuest, 
https://proxy.lib.umich.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest-
com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/1762334744?accountid=14667. 
“American Corners.” U.S. Embassy in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2019, 
cd.usembassy.gov/education-culture/american-spaces/american-corners/. 
Blankenship, Brian, and Renanah Miles Joyce. “Purchasing Power: US Overseas Defense 
Spending and Military Statecraft.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 64, no. 2–3, Feb. 
2020, pp. 545–573, doi:10.1177/0022002719854786. 
 
    73 
Buranelli, Filippo Costa. “Knockin’ on Heaven’s Door: Russia, Central Asia and the Mediated 
Expansion of International Society.” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, vol. 
42, no. 3, SAGE PUBLICATIONS LTD, 2014, pp. 817–36, 
doi:10.1177/0305829814540356. 
 
Chang, Byeong-Yun, and Kassymbekova, Assel. “The Relationship between FDI and Economic 
Growth: Kazakhstan Case.” Journal of the Korea Society for Simulation, vol. 21, no. 1, 
31/3/2012, pp. 19–26, doi:10.9709/JKSS.2012.21.1.019. 
Chatzky, Andrew, and James McBride. “China's Massive Belt and Road Initiative.” Council on 
Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, 21 May 2019, 
www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative. 
“China Lends Crisis-Hit Kazakhstan $10 Bln.” Reuters, 16 Apr. 2009. uk.reuters.com, 
https://uk.reuters.com/article/china-kazakhstan-loans-idUKLG94896920090416. 
 
Choi, Daeheon, et al. “Are Economic Distance and Geographic Remoteness Important in 
Sustainable Trade? Evidence from the Bilateral Trade between China and Kazakhstan.” 
Sustainability, vol. 11, no. 21, MDPI AG, 1/11/2019, p. 6068, doi:10.3390/su11216068. 
 
Clarke, Michael. Kazakhstan’s Multi-Vector Foreign Policy: Diminishing Returns in an Era of 
Great Power “Pivots”? | The Asan Forum. 9 Apr. 2015, 
http://www.theasanforum.org/kazakhstans-multi-vector-foreign-policy-diminishing-
returns-in-an-era-of-great-power-pivots/. 
Cooley, Alexander. “Central Asia: A Political History from the 19th Century to Present.” Asia 
Society, 2020, asiasociety.org/central-asia-political-history-19th-century-present. 
Coyer, Paul. “The Good News About Kazakhstan You May Have Missed.” Forbes, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/paulcoyer/2015/09/20/the-good-news-about-kazakhstan-
you-may-have-missed-this-summer/. Accessed 6 Feb. 2020. 
 
Cull, Nicholas. The Quest for Reputational Security: The Soft Power Agenda of Kazakhstan | 




Cull, Nicholas J. “The Tightrope to Tomorrow: Reputational Security, Collective Vision and the 
Future of Public Diplomacy.” The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 14, no. 1–2, Apr. 
2019, pp. 21–35. brill.com, doi:10.1163/1871191X-14011014. 
 
Curtis, Glenn E. “Country Profile: Kazakhstan.” United States Library of Congress-Federal 
Research Division, Dec. 2006, p. 20. 
Dawīša, ʻAdīd. The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia. Sharpe, 
1995. 
 
    74 
"Engel Statement on Kazakhstan Presidential Transition." U.S. House of Representatives 




Engvall, Johan. Kazakhstan’s Bid for the UN Security Council. 14 Dec. 2015, 
http://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13314-kazakhstan’s-bid-
for-the-un-security-council.html. 
“European Higher Education Area and Bologna Process.” European Higher Education Area and 
Bologna Process, 2019, www.ehea.info/. 
“Fact Sheet: The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.” Center for Arms Control 
and Non-Proliferation, 1 May 2015, armscontrolcenter.org/fact-sheet-the-nunn-lugar-
cooperative-threat-reduction-program/.  
Florida, Richard, et al. “Inside the Black Box of Regional Development—Human Capital, the 
Creative Class and Tolerance.” Journal of Economic Geography, vol. 8, no. 5, Oxford 
University Press, 1/9/2008, pp. 615–49, doi:10.1093/jeg/lbn023. 
 
Franke, Anja, et al. “Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan as Post-Soviet Rentier States: Resource 
Incomes and Autocracy as a Double ‘Curse’ in Post-Soviet Regimes.” Europe-Asia 
Studies, vol. 61, no. 1, 2009, pp. 109–40. JSTOR. 
Fulbright Student Program - About, us.fulbrightonline.org/about. 
“GDP per Capita (Current US$) - Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyz Republic, Turkmenistan, 
Kazakhstan.” Data, data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=TJ-UZ-
KG-TM-KZ. 
Hale, Henry E. "25 YEARS AFTER THE USSR: WHAT'S GONE WRONG?" Journal of 
Democracy, vol. 27, no. 3, 2016, pp. 24-35. ProQuest, 
https://proxy.lib.umich.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest-
com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/1812414543?accountid=14667. 
Higgins, Andrew. China’s Ambitious New ‘Port’: Landlocked Kazakhstan - The New York 
Times. 1 Jan. 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/01/world/asia/china-kazakhstan-
silk-road.html. 
Higgins, Andrew. “Kazakhstan Gets New Leader, but Old System's Grip on Power Remains.” 
The New York Times, The New York Times, 10 June 2019, 
www.nytimes.com/2019/06/10/world/asia/kazakhstan-president.html. 
“Human Development Reports.” Human Development Reports, 
hdr.undp.org/en/composite/HDI/. 
 
    75 
“Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs).” Harvard Law School, 2019, 
hls.harvard.edu/dept/opia/what-is-public-interest-law/public-service-practice-
settings/public-international-law/intergovernmental-organizations-igos/. 
“История Программы ‘Болашак.’” [Istorija Programmy ‘Bolashak’] Международные 
Стипендия Президента Республики Казахстан, [Mezhdunarodnye Stipendija 
Prezidenta Respubliki Kazahstan] 2016, bolashak.gov.kz/en/o-stipendii/istoriya-
razvitiya.html. 
Janenova, Saltanat, and Colin Knox. “Civil Service Reform in Kazakhstan: Trajectory to the 30 
Most Developed Countries?” International Review of Administrative Sciences, vol. 85, 
no. 3, Sept. 2019, pp. 419–439, doi:10.1177/0020852317722397. 
Jilkishieva, Mayra, et al. “Reforming the System of Higher Education in the Post-Soviet State: 
Features and Problems.” Reforming the System of Higher Education in the Post-Soviet 
State: Features and Problems | Atlantis Press, Atlantis Press, 1 Dec. 2019, www.atlantis-
press.com/proceedings/mplg-ia-19/125925325. 
Jones, Pauline Luong, and Erika Weinthal. Oil Is Not a Curse: Ownership Structure and 
Institutions in Soviet Successor States. Cambridge Univ. Press, 2011. 
Jumakulov, Zakir, et al. “Internationalizing Research in Kazakhstan Higher Education: A Case 
Study of Kazakhstan’s State Program of Industrial Innovative Development 2015 to 
2019.” Journal of Studies in International Education, vol. 23, no. 2, May 2019, pp. 234–
247, doi:10.1177/1028315318786445. 
 
Karimova, Dinara. Adapting from the United States Higher Education Model: University 




“Казакхстан и Китаи решат проблему трансграничныкх рек” [Kazakhstan i Kitai reshat 
problemu transgranichnykh rek]. Tengrinews.kz. 6 April 2013. 
https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/kazahstan–i–kitay–reshat– problemu–
transgranichnyih–rek–231537, accessed May 10, 2018. 
 
 “Indikativnyi plan razvitiia zakrytogo aktsionernogo obshchestva Natsional’naia kompaniia po 
transportirovke nefti ‘KazTransOil’ na 2000–2005 gg.” [Indicative Plan for the 
Development of the Closed Joint-Stock Company National Company for Oil 
Transportation KazTransOil for 2000–2005]. https://zakon.uchet. 
kz/rus/history/P000001252_/28.06.2002, accessed May 10, 2018. 
 
Kembayev, Zhenis. “Development of China–Kazakhstan Cooperation.” Problems of Post-




    76 
Keohane, Robert O. “International Relations and International Law: Interests, Reputation, 
Institutions.” Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International 
Law), vol. 93, 1999, pp. 375–379. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/25659335. Accessed 1 
Apr. 2020. 
 
Khan, Hina. “RUSSIA AND CENTRAL ASIA: THE EURASIAN ORIENTATION OF 
DEVELOPMENT.” Journal of European Studies, vol. 35, no. 1, AsiaNet Pakistan (Pvt) 
Ltd, 30/6/2019, p. 1. 
 
Kissane, Carolyn. (2005) History education in transit: where to for Kazakhstan?, Comparative 
Education, 41:1, 45-69, DOI: 10.1080/03050060500073249 
 
Koch, Natalie. “Kazakhstan’s Changing Geopolitics: The Resource Economy and Popular  
Attitudes about China’s Growing Regional Influence.” Eurasian Geography and 
Economics, vol. 54, no. 1, Feb. 2013, pp. 110–33. DOI.org (Crossref), 
doi:10.1080/15387216.2013.778542. 
 
Koch, Natalie. “The Shifting Geopolitics of Higher Education: Inter/Nationalizing Elite 
Universities in Kazakhstan, Saudi Arabia, and Beyond.” Geoforum, vol. 56, Elsevier Ltd, 
9/2014, pp. 46–54, doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2014.06.014. 
 
Konkakov, Alibek, and Gulaikhan Kubayeva. 2016. “Progress in Diversification of the Economy 
in Kazakhstan.” MSM Working Paper No. 2016/8, 
August. https://www.msm.nl/resources/uploads/2016/09/MSM–WP2016–8–1.pdf, 
accessed May 10, 2018.  
 
Kourmanova, Aitolkyn. Kazakhstan and the WTO: A New Era. 2 July 2015, 
https://www.csis.org/analysis/kazakhstan-and-wto-new-era. 
 





Kuraev, Alex. “Soviet Higher Education.” Higher Education, vol. 71, no. 2, Springer, 2016, pp. 
181–93, doi:10.1007/s10734-015-9895-5. 
 
Laruelle, Marlene, et al. “Untangling the Puzzle of ‘Russia’s Influence’ in Kazakhstan.” 
Eurasian Geography and Economics, vol. 60, no. 2, Mar. 2019, pp. 211–43. Taylor and 
Francis+NEJM, doi:10.1080/15387216.2019.1645033. 
 
LeVeck, Brad L, and Narang, Neil. “How International Reputation Matters: Revisiting Alliance 
Violations in Context.” International Interactions, vol. 43, no. 5, Routledge, 3/9/2017, 
pp. 797–821, doi:10.1080/03050629.2017.1237818. 
 
    77 
Li, Jian, et al. “Conceptualizing Soft Power of Higher Education: Globalization and Universities 
in China and the World.” Jian Li | Download, 2018, b-ok.cc/book/3664051/e07b6c. 
March, Andrew F. “The Use and Abuse of History: ‘National Ideology’ as Transcendental 
Object in Islam Karimov’s ‘Ideology of National Independence.’” Central Asian Survey, 
vol. 21, no. 4, Dec. 2002, pp. 371–84. DOI.org (Crossref), 
doi:10.1080/0263493032000053190. 
 
Massyrova, R., et al. “Changes in The Higher Education System of Kazakhstan.” Procedia - 
Social and Behavioral Sciences, vol. 185, May 2015, pp. 49–53. DOI.org (Crossref), 
doi:10.1016/j.sbspro.2015.03.458. 
 
McCarthy, Michael J. "The limits of friendship: US security cooperation in Central Asia." 
Walker Papers, no. 9, Oct. 2007, p. i+. Gale Academic OneFile, https://link-gale-
com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/apps/doc/A369066878/AONE?u=umuser&sid=AONE&xid=8b
39089c. Accessed 2 Apr. 2020. 
McGlinchey, Eric. “Analysis | Kazakh President Nazarbayev Has Resigned. Here Are Three 
Things to Watch.” The Washington Post, WP Company, 20 Mar. 2019, 
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/03/20/kazakh-president-nazarbayev-has-
resigned-here-are-three-things-watch/. 
Movkebaeva, Galiia A. “Energy Cooperation Among Kazakhstan, Russia, and China Within the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization.” Russian Politics & Law, vol. 51, no. 1, Routledge, 
1/1/2013, pp. 80–87, doi:10.2753/RUP1061-1940510105. 
 




Nazarbayev, Nur Sultan. “Послание Президента РК «Новые возможности развитииа͡ в 
условииа͡кх четвертоĭ промышленноĭ револиу͡т͡сии».” [“Poslanie Prezidenta RK 
«Novye vozmozhnosti razvitii͡ a v uslovii͡ akh chetvertoĭ promyshlennoĭ revoli͡ ut͡ sii»”]. 
Pravitelʹstvo Kazakhstana. 10 i͡ anvari͡ a 2018. 
 
-- President Nazarbayev Speaks at UN Security Council, Jan. 2018, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rvehLqlbBbs 
 
Nazarbayev, Nur Sultan. “Third Modernization of Kazakhstan: Global Competitiveness." State 
of Nation Address. 31 Jan. 2017. Astana, Kazakhstan.  
Nazarbayev, Nur Sultan. "Выступление Президента Республики Казахстан Н.А. Назарбаева 
на встрече с главами зарубежных дипломатических миссий, аккредитованных в 
Казахстане” [“Vystuplenie Prezidenta Respubliki Kazahstan N.A. Nazarbaeva na 
vstreche s glavami zarubezhnyh diplomaticheskih missij, akkreditovannyh v 
 
    78 
Kazahstane"]. Vstreche s glavami zarubezhnyh diplomaticheskih missij. 03.02.2012. 
Kazakhstan. 
“Назарбаев Получил Второй Титул За Два Дня.” [Nazarbaev Poluchil Vtoroj Titul Za Dva 
Dnja] Бывший СССР: Lenta.ru, 30 May 2019, 
lenta.ru/news/2019/05/30/nado_bolshe_zoita/. 
 “Nazarbayev University at a Glance.” Nazarbayev University, 2019, nu.edu.kz/about-
nazarbayev-university/nu-at-a-glance. 
Nurshayeva, Raushan. 2013. “Kazakhs Launch ‘Silk Road’ China–Europe Rail Route.” Reuters, 
June 10. https://www.reuters.com/article/uskazakhstan-railway/kazakhs-launch-silk-road-
china-europe-rail-routeidUSBRE9590GH20130610, accessed May 10, 2018. 
Nurullayev, Dmitriy. “Uzbekistan's Succession Question Is Russia's Strategic Opportunity.” – 
The Diplomat, For The Diplomat, 5 Sept. 2016, thediplomat.com/2016/09/uzbekistans-
succession-question-is-russias-strategic-opportunity/. 
Nye, Jr., Joseph S. "Soft Power and the Public Diplomacy Revisited." The Hague Journal of 
Diplomacy 14 (April 2019): 1-14. 
 
OEC - Kazakhstan (KAZ) Exports, Imports, and Trade Partners. 
https://oec.world/en/profile/country/kaz/. Accessed 21 Jan. 2020. 
 
“OIL; CNPC-AktobeMunaiGas Ups Oil Output 21% in 2017.” Interfax : Russia & CIS Oil & 
Gas Weekly, Interfax America, Inc, 31/1/2018. 
 
Oka, Natsuko. “Grades and Degrees for Sale: Understanding Informal Exchanges in 
Kazakhstan’s Education Sector.” Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 66, no. 5, 
Routledge, 3/9/2019, pp. 329–41, doi:10.1080/10758216.2018.1468269. 
 
Ostrowski, Wojciech. “Rentierism, Dependency and Sovereignty in Central Asia.” Sovereignty 
After Empire, Edinburgh University Press, 31/7/2011, 
doi:10.3366/edinburgh/9780748643042.003.0013. 
“Outbound Mobility from Kazakhstan up 140% over Past Decade.” ICEF Monitor - Market 
Intelligence for International Student Recruitment, 1 Apr. 2019, 
monitor.icef.com/2016/12/outbound-mobility-kazakhstan-140-past-decade/. 
Owen, Catherine, et al. “How Postcolonial Is Post-Western IR? Mimicry and Mētis in the 
International Politics of Russia and Central Asia.” Review of International Studies, vol. 




    79 
Perlez, Jane. 2013. “China Looks West as It Bolsters Regional Ties.” The New York Times. 
September 7. https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/08/ world/asia/china-looks-west-as-it-
strengthens-regional-ties.html, accessed May 10, 2018. 
 
Peters, M. A., Humes, W. (2003). Education in the knowledge economy [Editorial]. Policy 
Futures in Education, 1, 1-19. 
 
Pihlblad, David, and Robert G. Tian. "U. S. Economical Strategic Interests in Central Asia: 
Current Situations and Expectations for the Future." Journal of Management Policy and 
Practice, vol. 13, no. 3, 2012, pp. 95-105. ProQuest, 
https://proxy.lib.umich.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest-
com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/1021380280?accountid=14667. 
Pipes, Richard. The Formation of the Soviet Union. Harvard University Press, 1964. 
Piven, G., and Iu. Pak. “Higher Education in Kazakhstan and the Bologna Process.” Russian 
Education & Society, vol. 48, no. 10, Oct. 2006, pp. 82–91. DOI.org (Crossref), 
doi:10.2753/RES1060-9393481007. 
 
"POLITICS & SOCIETY; WTO Ministerial Conference to be Held in Nur-Sultan in June 
2020." Interfax: Central Asia & Caucasus Business Weekly, 2019. ProQuest, 
https://proxy.lib.umich.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/2299488551?
accountid=14667. 
Pomfret, Richard, and Anderson, Kathryn. “Economic Development Strategies in Central Asia 
since 1991.” Asian Studies Review, vol. 25, no. 2, Taylor & Francis Group, 1/6/2001, pp. 
185–200, doi:10.1080/10357820108713304. 
 
Poslanie Prezidenta RK «Novye vozmozhnosti razvitii͡ a v uslovii͡ akh chetvertoĭ promyshlennoĭ 
revoli͡ ut͡ sii». http://government.kz/ru/address/10012018. Accessed 26 Feb. 2020. 
Реализация госпрограммы геологоразведки: В РК будут привлечены до 6 трлн тг 
инвестиций и созданы дополнительно более 20 тыс. рабочих мест. [Realizacija 
gosprogrammy geologorazvedki: V RK budut privlecheny do 6 trln tg investicij i sozdany 
dopolnitel'no bolee 20 tys. rabochih mest] 
https://www.government.kz/ru/news/realizaciya-gosprogrammy-geologorazvedki-v-rk-
budut-privlecheny-do-6-trln-tg-investiciy-i-sozdany-dopolnitelno-bolee-20-tys-rabochih-
mest. Accessed 26 Feb. 2020. 
Room, Graham. “Globalisation, Social Policy and International Standard‐setting: The Case of 
Higher Education Credentials.” International Journal of Social Welfare, vol. 9, no. 2, 
Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 4/2000, pp. 103–19, doi:10.1111/1468-2397.00116. 
Sadovskaya, Yelena. “Educational Migration from Kazakhstan to China: A Shift Eastward?” The 




    80 
Safire, William. “The Near Abroad.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 22 May 1994, 
www.nytimes.com/1994/05/22/magazine/on-language-the-near-abroad.html. 




Sartori, Anne Elizabeth. Deterrence by Diplomacy. 1998. 
 
S-CICA: About CICA. http://www.s-cica.org/page.php?page_id=7&lang=1. Accessed 26 Nov. 
2019. 
 
Serikkaliyeva, Azhar, Aidarbek Amirbek, and Eftal Ş. Batmaz. "Chinese Institutional Diplomacy 
Toward Kazakhstan: The SCO and the New Silk Road Initiative." Insight Turkey, vol. 20, 
no. 4, 2018, pp. 129-151.  
 
Serikkaliyeva, Azhar E, et al. “Educational Migration from Kazakhstan to China: Reality and 
Prospects.” Integration of Education, vol. 23, no. 4, 31/12/2019, pp. 504–17, 
doi:10.15507/1991-9468.097.023.201904.504-517. 
 
Shepard, Wade. 2016. “The Western Europe–Western China Expressway to Connect the Yellow 
Sea with the Baltic.” Forbes. July 10. http:// 
www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2016/07/10/the-western-europewestern-china-
expressway-to-connect-the-yellow-sea-with-the-baltic /#5f09450b2066, accessed May 
10, 2018. 
 
Sidel, Victor W, and Barry S Levy. “Proliferation of nuclear weapons: opportunities for control 
and abolition.” American journal of public health vol. 97,9 (2007): 1589-94. 
doi:10.2105/AJPH.2006.100602 
 
Sovereignty After Empire : Comparing the Middle East and Central Asia, edited by Sally N. 




SPFIID. (2010). State Program of Forced Industrial and Innovative Development of Kazakhstan 
2010-2014 (Approved by the Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 
March 19, 2010, No. 958). Retrieved from http://www.akorda.kz/upload/SPFIID.doc 
 
Starr, S. Frederick. "The Emergence of Central Asia, 2018, and U.S. Strategy." Hearing before 




“Strategii͡ a ‘Kazakhstan-2050’.” http://mfa.gov.kz/ru/tokyo/content-view/kazakhstan-2050-
strategy. Accessed 5 Feb. 2020. 
 
    81 
 
"The Junior Partner." The Economist, vol. 432, no. 9153, Jul 27, 2019, pp. 15-18. ProQuest, 
https://proxy.lib.umich.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/2264579024?
accountid=14667. 
“The Nunn-Lugar Project.” National Security Archive, 5 Dec. 2019, 
nsarchive.gwu.edu/project/nunn-lugar. 
“The World Factbook: Kazakhstan.” Central Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, 1 
Feb. 2018, www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kz.html. 
 “Trade Statistics by Country / Region.” WITS, 2019, 
wits.worldbank.org/countrystats.aspx?lang=en. 
“Understanding the WTO - Standards and Safety.” WTO, 
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm4_e.htm. 
“Uzbekistan's New Leader Pledges Better Ties with Russia, US.” AP NEWS, Associated Press, 9 
Sept. 2016, apnews.com/246b1da92c48428fafb964943f39742d. 
Vassilenko, Roman. “Central Asia and the Regional Stability: The Strategic Role of 
Kazakhstan.” Italian Society for International Organizations, 28 March 2019, Rome, 
Italy. 
 
Wang, Jian. “Managing National Reputation and International Relations in the Global Era: 
Public Diplomacy Revisited.” Public Relations Review, vol. 32, no. 2, Elsevier Inc, 2006, 
pp. 91–96, doi:10.1016/j.pubrev.2005.12.001. 
 
Warner, Jonathan. The Geographical Journal, vol. 167, no. 2, 2001, pp. 185–187. JSTOR, 
www.jstor.org/stable/3060500. Accessed 26 Feb. 2020. 
 
Wasserman, Paul. “Between a Bear and a Dragon: New Challenges for Kazakhstan | GRI.” 
Global Risk Insights, 26 Mar. 2019, https://globalriskinsights.com/2019/03/kazakhstan-
china-russia-leader/. 
 
WITS (World Integrated Trade Solution). 1995 “Kazakhstan Trade Summary 1995 Data.” 
https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/ Country/KAZ/Year/1995/Summary, 
accessed May 10, 2018. 
 
Wittke, Cindy. “‘Test the West’: Reimagining Sovereignties in the Post-Soviet Space.” Review 
of Central and East European Law, vol. 43, no. 1, 28/2/2018, pp. 1–22, 
doi:10.1163/15730352-04301005. 
Yalcin, Resul. The Rebirth of Uzbekistan: Politics, Economy and Society in the Post-Soviet Era. 
Ithaca Press, 2002. 
 
    82 
Ziegler, Charles E. “Russia in Central Asia: The Dynamics of Great-Power Politics in a Volatile 
Region.” Asian Perspective, vol. 38, no. 4, Institue for Far Eastern Studies, 1/10/2014, 
pp. 589–617, doi:10.1353/apr.2014.0026. 
 
